









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 




















Guidance and Control of Sounding Rockets
David Andrew Wright
A dissertation submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering,
University of Cape Town, in fulfilment of the requirements















I know the meaning of plagiarism and declare that all the work in the document, save
for that which is properly acknowledged, is my own.














This dissertation presents the design, fabrication and testing of a sounding rocket flight
computer for the South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO).
Sounding rockets carry instruments with which to take measurements in the Earth’s at-
mosphere in sub-orbital flight. The South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO)
requires a flight computer for their sounding rockets. This flight computer is to replace
the current commercial flight computer currently in use improving on its functionality
and expandability.
Based on SAAO’s requirements a specification has been derived. This specification
includes the functions required of the flight computer, the stresses and constraints the
flight computer must operate under and the testing procedures to verify the opera-
tion of the flight computer. From this specification a modular and extensible flight
computer has been designed and implemented. The design included the design of the
hardware as well as the design of the operating system and algorithms to run on the
flight computer hardware. In order to meet the requirements of SAAO a master-slave
architecture was chosen in the design using the Controller Area Network bus.
Once designed the flight computer was prototyped and tested using tests outlined in
the specification. The hardware has been taken through three prototyping phases, with
each phase bringing the flight computer closer to meeting the specification. Algo-
rithms were prototyped and simulated on a PC in the C language before being ported
to embedded C with fixed point arithmetic to run on the hardware. Simulations were
carried out with actual flight data obtained from the RDAS mailing list. Also devel-
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This dissertation presents the design, fabrication and testing of a sounding rocket flight
computer for the South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO).
This chapter will begin with an introduction to sounding rocketry in order to famil-
iarise the reader with the application of the flight computer. This will be followed by
a discussion of the background to the project, an explanation of the objective of the
project and finally an overview of this dissertation.
1.1 Sounding Rockets
Sounding rockets carry instruments with which to take measurements in the Earth’s at-
mosphere in sub-orbital flight. The name is derived from the nautical term “to sound”,
meaning to measure [1]. The typical trajectory of a sounding rocket as shown in figure
1.1 is parabolic. This means that the initial trajectory of the rocket is near vertical,
ending in what appears to be a brief pause at apogee before descending back to the
Earth’s surface along a trajectory dependent on the recovery systems and atmospheric
conditions. This highly vertical sub-orbital trajectory means that it is possible to re-
cover the rocket near the launch site. Further, because the rocket is only required to












the ideal platform for low-cost, high-altitude experiments [2].
For a rocket to function as a sounding rocket it requires the ability to detect in-
flight events such as apogee and to initiate in-flight events such as the deployment
of parachutes. Without this capability it would not be possible to recover the rocket
or the measurement data from any on-board instrumentation. In order to provide this
capability a rocket requires a flight computer. This may be as simple as an altime-
ter measuring only atmospheric pressure in order to detect apogee and control the
deployment of parachutes, or as complex as a six-degree-of-freedom inertial measure-
ment unit with support for external experimental payloads, cameras, GPS, telemetry,
multiple igniter firing channels and in-flight user control.
In summary, a sounding rocket flight computer is required to facilitate two major
functions. Firstly it must facilitate measurement of flight performance and various
atmospheric variables and secondly it must respond to this measured data to detect
and initiate in-flight events such as launch, stage separation, stage ignition and the
launch of recovery systems.
1.2 Project Background
Each year the South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO) runs a space technol-
ogy course in conjunction with the University of Cape Town. As part of this course
the students design an electronics payload for a sounding rocket. Up until now the
project has used a commercially available flight computer to support their payloads,
but this flight computer no longer meets the requirements of the rocket project. This is
due to the fact that the flight computer is limited in its ability to measure inertial and
atmospheric variables, is inflexible in terms of its ability to support external payloads
and is unable to guarantee data integrity.
In a general survey of rocket flight computers it appears that manufacturers for the
most part cater either for the amateur rocketry community or for the professional
aerospace and defence community. This means that commercially available flight












Figure 1.1: Launch: Launch commences with the ignition of the first stage motor.
This involves the firing of pyrotechnics in order to start a rocket motor. Separation:
If the rocket is a multi-stage stage rocket, it will separate from the burnt out first-stage
rocket motor, generally using drag or a pyrotechnic charge. The burnt out first-stage
will deploy a parachute to descend to the ground. Stage Ignition: Once separated the
rocket will fire a pyrotechnic charge in order to ignite a new motor stage. The process
of separation and stage ignition will be repeated until all the rocket motor stages have
burnt out. Apogee: The rocket will continue up to its apogee, where it will deploy
its parachutes. Normally a smaller drogue chute will be deployed first, followed by a
much larger master parachute. Landing: The flight ends with the rocket landing on













in nature, aiming to support the bare minimum of functions to enable rocket launch
and recovery. Two such products are the GWIZ series of flight computers [3] and the
very popular RDAS flight computer [4], which we shall review later. Societies or uni-
versities that desire more complex electronics to control their rockets generally design
and build their own systems, as in the case of the Portland State Aerospace Society [5].
This is illustrative of SAAO’s need for the design of their own flight computer. There
simply is no commercially available flight computer that can fulfil their complex re-
quirements, and instead of spending large sums of money on defence or space-grade
flight computers they have chosen to build their own flight computer catering to their
specific needs.
1.3 Project Objective
The objective of this dissertation is to produce a sounding rocket flight computer that
meets the requirements of the SAAO. This includes a review and analysis of available
flight computers, followed by the design, fabrication and testing of a flight computer
to meet the requirements of the SAAO.
1.4 Dissertation Overview
Review of Similar Work
Once the documentation was in place describing what the flight computer was required
to do, a review of flight computers, either available commercially or in development
by other research institutions, was started. Two flight computers were selected for
review, the RDAS flight computer [6], manufactured by AED electronics, and the
Portland State Aerospace LV2b [7] flight computer. A summary of this review is
given below; the full review may be found in chapter 2.
The RDAS was the commercially available flight computer that the SAAO had pre-













• A monolithic architecture in a failure-prone environment.
• An extensible architecture, where the extension does not improve redundancy.
Through the review of the RDAS a number of important lessons were learnt; these
included:
• The importance of redundancy in a failure-prone environment.
• The importance of reconfigurability and extensibility in a reusable flight com-
puter.
• The need for modularity to facilitate an extensible architecture.
• The importance of clear flight computer status indications in dangerous envi-
ronments, such as a launch site.
The PSAS LV2b flight computer was developed by the Portland State Aerospace So-
ciety. It is similar to this project in that it is a university-built flight computer for an
experimental sounding rocket program.
The review of the LV2b flight computer revealed a particular design choice this writer
deems to be poor. The LV2b uses a master-slave architecture in which the main com-
munication bus on the flight computer is USB. This introduces a single-point failure
for the whole flight computer because the communication bus requires the USB hub
to be functioning for any communication to take place.
A number of positive lessons were learnt from review of the LV2b; these included:
• The ability of the master-slave architecture to achieve extensibility and modu-
larity.
• The review of communication buses, such as USB, informed selection of possi-












• The use of backup power supplies for critical systems to avoid mission failure
in the event of a battery pack failure.
• The self-calibration of the inertial measurement unit via the temperature sensor
was noted for possible inclusion in the SAAO flight computer.
Requirements, Functional Analysis and Specification
The SAAO provided a list of 21 requirements for their flight computer. These re-
quirements were analysed for their functional content, and then broken down into the
functions that are required of the flight computer. Table 1.1 sho s the breakdown of
these functions with reference to the requirements from which they are derived. A full
discussion of the SAAO requirements and their functional breakdown may be found
in chapter 3.
Design
Having reviewed some existing flight computers, the design of SAAO flight computer
began in earnest. The design and fabrication philosophy used in this project was the
spiral model. This entailed a cycle of design, fabrication, testing and redesign [8]. The
following is a summary of the design of the SAAO flight computer. A full description
of the design may be found in chapter 4.
Before each of the individual functions could be designed for, the overall system ar-
chitecture needed to be decided upon. To this end, four major architectures were
reviewed and the master-slave architecture was chosen as the best suited architecture
to meet the specification. Further, the Controller Area Network communication bus
(CAN bus) was chosen from amongst a number of alternative bus architectures includ-
ing I2C and RS - 485. Figure 1.2 is a diagram showing the final system architecture.
The master-slave architecture and the requirement for modularity necessitate that each
function or associated group of functions be assigned to an individual node. Each node
















F1 Measurement of acceleration in X, Y, Z, Pitch,
Yaw and Roll
R1
F2 Measurement of pressure R1
F3 Determination of position via GPS, F1 and F2 R1
F4 Measurement of temperature R1
F5 Measurement of flight computer currents and
voltages
R5, R7
F6 System status monitoring R5, R7, R15
F7 F1 - F6 Stored in persistent memory R8, R16
F8 F1 - F6 Transmitted via wireless link R3, R10
F9 Detection of launch R2.1
F10 Detection of motor burnout R2.2
F11 Detection of separation R2.3
F12 Detection of new stage ignition R2.4
F13 Detection of apogee R2.5
F14 Detection of landing R2.6
F15 Detection of trajectory outside of defined trajec-
tory
R11
F16 Launch initiation R9
F17 Separation of rocket stages R2.2, R9
F18 Ignition of rocket stage motors R2.3, R9
F19 Ground station display of real-time flight data R6, R10
F20 Flight computer control via the ground station R6, R10
F21 Audible indication of status R5
























transceiver to provide access to the bus.
The flight computer consists of five nodes:
• The Master Node - This node deals with power distribution and data storage.
• The Recovery Node - This node deals with the firing of igniters to respond to
in-flight events.
• The GPS Node - This node receives and processes GPS information.
• The Telemetry Node - This node sends and receives data from a ground station
via a wireless communication link.
• The Guidance and Control Node - This node measures inertial information in 6
degrees of freedom, processes it and provides th user with the ability to control
actuators with which to affect the flight path.
A sixth independent node is designed to serve as a ground station and includes GPS
measurement and telemetry.
The firmware for the flight computer uses a time-triggered architecture [9]. This ar-
chitecture was chosen over a pre-emptive architecture because it provides increased
reliability and decreased system overhead. The flight computer uses a shared clock
scheduler in order to synchronise the clocks of each of the nodes [9][10]. This pro-
vides a way to control communication on the CAN bus in a time-triggered manner.
RF Design of the Telemetry Output Stage
The purpose of the telemetry output stage is to increase the range of the telemetry. The
output stage was designed and simulated using Agilent’s Gensys. The RF output stage
uses a switching architecture to incorporate both a power amplifier and a low noise
amplifier onto the output and input of the RF transceiver. The switching is controlled
by the RF transceiver; when the transceiver is in transmission mode it switches the












Amplifier S11 (dB) S21 (dB) Isolation (dB)
PA -25.763 21.189
LNA -22.248 22.409
SPDT -19.7 -0.35 -26
Table 1.2: Simulated RF output stage S parameters.
the output stage to the low noise amplifier channel. Table 1.2 shows the expected S
parameters of the output stage.
Fabrication, Firmware/Software Development and Testing - Where
good ideas face reality
Following the design of the SAAO flight computer, a number of prototypes were fab-
ricated. Each of these prototypes was then tested for workmanship errors and fun-
damental design flaws. A brief overview of the fabrication, firmware development,
testing and the results obtained is given below, a full description may be found in
chapter 5.
Initial testing was carried out by writing test firmware for each of the peripherals on
the node micro-controllers. In order to test the power distribution and measurement
functions the master node was linked to resistive loads to verify the ability to both
switch the power channels on and off and to measure the current consumption on each
channel.
Although vibration and temperature testing are essential in the development of a flight
computer for a rocket application, the lack of access to facilities in the time frame
of this masters prevented this testing. The only environment-based testing done was
vacuum testing. A board consisting of the node micro-controller and supporting elec-
tronics was placed in a vacuum chamber in order verify that the electronics would not













A graphical user interface (GUI) was written to test the functionality of the flight
computer and to provide a platform to run simulations both on a PC and in the loop
with the flight computer. The GUI was written using the QT framework in the C++
language. The graphical user interface provides manual control of the flight computer
power management system and the recovery node igniter control system. It also shows
the current inertial and power status of the flight computer. This information is dis-
played in LCD displays as voltages, currents, acceleration, velocity and position, and
as real-time plots of acceleration and altitude.
In order to develop working algorithms for Kalman filtering and event detection, sim-
ulation code was written on a PC. Simulations were written in the C language and
run using real recorded rocket flight datasets obtained from the RDAS flight computer
mailing list. Event detection times were compared to the times given by the RDAS
graphical user interface for the given dataset. Figure 1.3 shows the filtered and unfil-
tered data for the altitude of a rocket. The vertical green lines show the events with
the time of detection and the event name.
The filtering and event detection algorithms were implemented in the inertial measure-
ment unit by converting the floating-point arithmetic based algorithm into a fixed-point
arithmetic based algorithm. The algorithms were then benchmarked using the same
datasets used for the simulation. This was done to ensure that the algorithms were
able to run at the required rate on the node micro-controller. The outputs of the imple-
mented algorithms were also tested to ensure that they were the same as the simulated
algorithms.
RF Implementation and Testing
The simulated RF designs were implemented and tested using a network analyser.
Table 1.3 shows the S parameters obtained from the tests.
The results were not as good as the simulations. This may be explained by a number of
factors. Among these is the inaccurate milling of the circuit boards and the assembly
of the circuit boards by hand. In the case of the LNA, there was difficulty in tuning












Figure 1.3: Plot of measured altitude (blue) and filtered altitude (red) of the apogee












Amplifier S11 (dB) S21 (dB) Isolation (dB)
PA -16.412 18.988
LNA -14.610 27.509
SPDT -16.268 -0.7101 -21.074
Table 1.3: Measured RF ouptut stage parameters.
short. Finally, the S21 parameter of the SPDT is double the expected value because in
the test set-up used the signal travelled through two SPDT switches.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have developed a rocket flight computer based on the requirements given by the
SAAO. Each of the functions outlined in Table 1.1 was met, except for Functions
11, 12, 15, 17 and 18. These functions were not met either due to time constraints, or
because they were dependent on functions omitted due to time constraints, for example
Function 15, or due to a lack of multi-stage rocket flight data, as was the case with
Functions 11, 12, 17 and 18. Not all the required testing was possible due to lack of
access to facilities, such as a vibration chamber. Future work includes:
• Implementation of an attitude filter to fulfil Function requirement 15.
• Implementation of an algorithm to detect outside nominal trajectories as per
Function 15.
• Implementation of algorithms to detect stage-separation and new stage-ignition
as per Functions 11 and 12.
• Implementation of an algorithm for triggering separation and new stage-ignition
as per Functions 17 and 18.
• Further testing and refining of the SAAO flight computer including simulation
testing under rocket flight conditions.













• Implementation of guidance and control of the rocket through the inertial mea-
surement unit.
1.5 Conclusion
In summary of this chapter we have introduced the background and the objective of the
project to reader. This was followed by a review of the relevant rocketry information
regarding rocket flight profiles and in-flight events. We also gave the reader a brief
overview of what to expect in this dissertation. In the following chapter we shall












System Review of Currently Available
Systems
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we shall review two flight computers, giving an overview of their ar-
chitectures and features. We shall also note the pros and cons of the design of each
flight computer. Finally, the lessons learnt from each flight computer will be noted
and carried forward into the design of the SAAO flight computer.
2.2 RDAS
Figure 2.1 shows the RDAS flight computer main circuit board. The RDAS flight
computer is a commercially available flight computer aimed at the amateur rocketry
community. It is manufactured in the Netherlands by a company called AED Elec-
tronics[6]. The review of this flight computer is especially applicable here because it
is the flight computer that this dissertation aims to improve upon and replace.
The RDAS provides in-flight measurement of acceleration and pressure, which it uses
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Figure 2.2: RDAS block diagram [6].
is able to deploy recovery systems through two igniter channels. These igniter chan-
nels can be configured to fire at the detection of apogee or after a user-defined time
interval. There are also a number of user defined digital and analogue inputs to the
RDAS allowing the user some flexibility in terms of the payloads the RDAS can sup-
port. Finally, through additional expansion nodes the RDAS is also able to provide
GPS measurements and telemetry.
RDAS Architecture
The primary features of the RDAS flight computer are arranged in a monolithic ar-
chitecture on a single circuit board. The advantage of this is that the flight computer
occupies the least possible space. Figure 2.2 shows a block diagram of the RDAS
flight computer.
The microprocessor controls all the operational functions in the above diagram, in-
cluding the igniter stages, the buzzer, the memory, the inertial and pressure transducers
and the additional analogue and digital I/O ports. Communication with the processor













Power Supply The RDAS requires a minimum voltage of 9V on its power supply
which it then regulates down to the required DC voltages. The RDAS may also be
powered through its USB port that is used for serial communication with the device.
Status Indication The RDAS uses a buzzer to convey a series of status-related mes-
sages to the user in a clearly audible manner. This is especially useful on the launch
pad, when it is not possible to connect a computer to the RDAS to monitor its opera-
tion. It also provides an easy way of identifying fault conditions on the RDAS.
Inertial and Pressure Measurement Acceleration is measured in the Z axis, that is
the axis parallel to the long axis of the rocket, on the main RDAS board with a range of
±50g. The sensor is an analogue sensor with low power and low noise characteristics.
These sensor features are important given the power constraints imposed by batter-
ies and the need to determine the altitude of the rocket accurately and reliably when
triggering recovery events. Pressure is measured with an absolute pressure transducer
that is temperature-compensated over a range of -40◦C to 125◦C. The sensor is how-
ever limited to measuring pressures down to a minimum of 20kPa. This limits the
maximum altitude at which the sensor will function to a maximum of approximately
10km. Temperature compensation is important here as it allows for a more accurate
measurement of altitude through the measurement of atmospheric ambient pressure.
The pressure transducer provides a second measurement of altitude for redundancy.
This illustrates the principle of redundant design.
Analogue and Digital Inputs The RDAS provides 4 digital TTL inputs to the user
to support mission-related experiments. The RDAS logs the data that arrives on the
port to EEPROM. The RDAS also provides 6 analogue inputs that are also logged to
EEPROM. In this way the RDAS provides support for external payloads. It should be
noted however that the limitation of this approach is that the data measured by these












user cannot add further redundancy to the RDAS.
Memory The RDAS has enough persistent memory to store eight minutes of data
from all of its input ports when they are sampled at a rate of 200Hz. This is the
maximum available sampling frequency of the RDAS and once the sampling rate is
set for a mission, it is fixed for the duration of the flight. This eight minutes puts an
upper limit on the length of flight for which the RDAS may be deployed.
Extensible Architecture The RDAS is extensible allowing for the connection of
telemetry, GPS and inertial measurements in additional axes. These additions are
done via the I2C communication bus and power is supplied through the main power
supply. The user cannot manufacture or add further nodes to the RDAS as access is
not given to the user to extend the RDAS firmware or to add generic nodes and so
the operation of the RDAS is limited to the use of the nodes that AED Electronics
provides.
As mentioned above, the RDAS makes use of the I2C communication bus between
its extension nodes. I2C is a two-wire communication bus including a clock line
and a data line[11]. This bus includes bus arbitration and a standard 7-bit addressing
system. However, the protocol does not include any data correction, such as cyclic
redundancy checks and message retransmission. This makes using this bus to trans-
mit event-critical data unsafe, especially as this bus does not make use of differential
communication making it particularly susceptible to electromagnetic noise. In the
case of the RDAS no event-critical data is transmitted over the I2C bus. However, the
integrity of the data stored on the ground station is dependent on the integrity of the
data on the I2C bus.
Telemetry Extension The telemetry extension for the RDAS operates over the 433MHz
ISM band. It uses a Radiometrix transmitter-receiver pair and so operates only in a
single direction; from the RDAS to the ground station. The RDAS transmits the data
it measures through the telemetry module to the ground station for storage and display












there is no way for the ground station to control the rocket in response to this data.
With the correct antennas mounted on the ground station and the RDAS, the range
of the RDAS telemetry can be extended to a maximum of approximately 15km. The
telemetry extension provides a redundant means of data storage through the ground
station.
The greatest limitation of the telemetry for the RDAS is that the user cannot be certain
of the integrity of the measurement data. There is no error checking and correction
of the packets sent to the ground station because the link is in only one direction. It
should be noted however that the integrity of the data is not critical in the case of the
RDAS because the telemetry data is not used to make any critical in-flight decisions.
GPS Extension The GPS extension for the RDAS provides GPS measurements
through a commercial GPS Receiver. Such receivers adhere to ITAR regulations. This
restricts the acceleration and velocity in which GPS receivers may return position in-
formation. This means that the GPS will only return position readings after the burn
phase of the rocket motor when the acceleration drops below 4g and when the rocket
is travelling below a velocity of 515m/s. Generally this means that the GPS receiver
will only regain lock with the GPS satellite signal at apogee. This renders GPS mea-
surement almost useless for position and altitude calculations in the first half of the
flight. On the RDAS the data from the GPS is logged to the EEPROM and transmitted
to the ground station.
Accelerometer Extension The accelerometer extension for the RDAS provides a
further two axes of linear inertial measurement which may be chosen by the user
through the orientation of the extension board. The data is logged by the main RDAS
board to EEPROM and transmitted to the ground station.
Event Detection
Launch In order to detect launch the RDAS uses two simultaneous approaches for












wire to the main circuit board. This feature is essentially a manual switch. When the
rocket is on the launchpad, a jumper is connected across two pins creating a closed
circuit. A wire is attached to the jumper and to the launchpad so that when the rocket
launches the jumper is pulled off the two pins creating an open circuit. In this way
launch is detected. Secondly, the RDAS is able to detect launch through a large spike
in acceleration measured on its Z-axis accelerometer.
Apogee According to the RDAS manual, detection of apogee is done through two
different methods. This redundancy is provided because the detection of apogee is
vital for triggering the launch of recovery systems. The first method is a timer. The
user, knowing the technical details of the rocket and the launch, should be able to
calculate the time the rocket will take to reach apogee. The user may then input
this time into the RDAS and the RDAS will trigger the recovery systems at the user-
selected time. The second method the RDAS uses to detect apogee is through the
use of the acceleration data from the Z-axis accelerometer. According to the RDAS
manual, the RDAS integrates this acceleration data and when the integral calculated
reaches zero, that is, when the rocket reaches a velocity of zero, apogee is detected
and the recovery systems are triggered [6]. The problem with this approach is that
the Z-axis accelerometer measures acceleration in the rocket’s reference frame. As in
figure 3.1 the Z-axis is the axis through the nose and tail of the rocket. This means
that for flights that are not perfectly vertical the accelerometer is not only measuring
acceleration in the vertical direction, that is in altitude direction, but also horizontally
over the surface of the Earth. The zero velocity point will therefore not be a true
calculation of apogee. This measurement is therefore a poor estimation of apogee
that deteriorates the more horizontal a given rocket flight is. In fact apogee may not
be detected at all in very horizontal flights because the velocity in the Z-axis of the
rocket may not reach zero before the rocket hits the ground. This is because the Z-
axis rotates with the rocket. For very horizontal flights the component of the Z-axis
acceleration affected by gravity is small. In this case drag has a much larger affect on
the acceleration of the rocket in the Z-axis. However, unless the opposing wind speed
is very high, and therefore the relative velocity between the wind and the rocket is very












Figure 2.3: Trajectory scenario with a large initial launch angle.
the Z-axis velocity to become negative. Figure 2.3 illustrates a flight trajectory with a
large horizontal component.
Graphical User Interface
The RDAS graphical user interface (GUI) provides the user with a real-time display of
the data sent from the RDAS in the rocket, provided there is a working telemetry link
between the ground station and the rocket. The program is able to display the data in
real-time plots and to mark in-flight events such as launch and apogee on the plots for
the user to see. It is also able to save and store data for later analysis. The program
is able to plot the trajectory of the rocket for the user when using the GPS extension
board. All the measured data may be accessed in raw form from the program.
The RDAS GUI allows the user to download the data stored on the RDAS EEPROM
through the serial connection. The serial connection also allows the user to configure
the RDAS, for example, to use the apogee detection timer. Finally the serial connec-
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Lessons from the RDAS to be Carried Forward
The RDAS provides a minimum benchmark for a useful flight computer to measure
the performance of a rocket in-flight and to support operational rocket flight through
the detection and control of in-flight events. One of the major drawbacks of the RDAS
is its inability to use its extensibility to increase its redundancy in event detection
and control of rocket flight. So, for example, the user may include a further two
accelerometers, a GPS and rotational inertial sensors through the digital or analogue
inputs, but the RDAS is incapable of making use of this extra data to improve or extend
its performance.
A number of important things have been learnt through the use and analysis of the
RDAS. These include:
• The importance of redundancy and so redundant design in rocket flight comput-
ers.
• The importance of reconfigurability and extensibility in a reusable flight com-
puter.
• The need for modularity to enable extensibility and reconfigurability and thus
to overcome the drawbacks of the monolithic architecture.
• Numerous lessons pertaining to the operational limits of transducers and how
they affect the operational limits of a flight computer in rocket applications.
• The importance of clear status indications when the flight computer is not on
the work bench. In the RDAS case this is done through the buzzer.
2.3 Portland State Aerospace Society LV2b Flight Com-
puter
The Portland State Aerospace Society (PSAS) at Portland State University is an educa-
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state of the art flight computers. This review will cover their LV2b flight computer[7].
LV2b Architecture
Figure 2.4 shows a diagram of the flight computer architecture of the PSAS LV2b
flight computer.
As shown in Figure 2.4, the LV2b flight computer uses a master-slave architecture
with a single master controlling a number of independent slaves. Each feature on the
flight computer is given to a new node to make it completely independent of the rest
of the flight computer.
Communication Bus The PSAS LV2b uses a USB hub to facilitate communication
between the master node and the slave nodes. This has the advantage of providing very
high bandwidth 12Mb/s whilst still providing the noise resistance of a differential bus.
The draw back is that USB requires the master node to initiate all communication. So,
for example, if the inertial measurement unit needs to transmit some data to the ground
station, the master node must poll the inertial measurement unit for the data and then
send it to the telemetry node. This means that if the master node fails during a flight
all inter-node communication is stopped since USB hub is completely dependent on
the master node.
The reasons PSAS decided to use USB for the inter node communication were largely
based on software concerns. One of the major concerns raised by PSAS in their se-
lection was that the use of CAN would limit their control of the sending of messages.
CAN will retransmit a message until it is received. PSAS’s point was that they would
prefer to drop a message and receive the next critical packet then to delay a critical
message. Further they were concerned that there was little open source support for
CAN and that CAN is limited to 1Mb/s.
Based on the limitations of USB in terms of its dependency on a single node to func-
tion this writer does not consider USB a good design decision. If flexibility in the
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Figure 2.4: PSAS LV2b flight computer architecture [7].
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would have been more suitable. RS-485 provides a differential bus like the CAN bus
capable of data rates up to 35Mb/s. It does not force the user to use any specific
transmission protocol and it does not depend on a single node to function correctly.
Furthermore, this writer does not consider the existence of open source support as a
good factor to consider when choosing a subsystem as critical as the communication
bus.
Master Node The master node on the LV2b controls the USB hub, as well as being
the connection point for external communications with a computer. The node is run by
a Power PC running a real-time operating system (RTOS) called eCOS which includes
built in support for USB communications.
Slave Nodes
Common Slave Node Blocks Each of the slave nodes has its own 32-bit 60MHz
ARM processor controlling communications with the master node and facilitating the
functions of the node. The major requirement that PSAS had for this processor was
that it should be capable of over 10MIPS and that it should support USB.
Power Management System The PSAS power management unit uses a switch
mode power supply to regulate their 16.8V battery supply down to 3.3V. The battery
voltage is regulated down to 3.3V through the use of a switch mode buck regulator.
A secondary 5V supply is made available through a Low Drop Out (LDO) regulator
for components requiring the high supply voltage. Supply of power to the individual
nodes is controlled through a set of mosfet switches.
Inertial Measurement Unit The PSAS inertial measurement unit provides mea-
surement of inertial data in 3 linear axes, X, Y and Z and 3 rotation axes, pitch yaw
and roll. It also provides pressure measurement and temperature measurement. The
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output of MEMs sensors drifts with temperature, this drift can be characterised and so
the outputs of the MEMs sensors can be calibrated in real-time with temperature.
Recovery The PSAS recovery system provides igniters for the main parachute and
the backup parachute. The channels are controlled through the use of mosfet switches.
Further backup power is supplied to the node in case of a flight computer failure. This
helps to prevent a flight failure in the event of a major flight computer failure.
Telemetry The PSAS telemetry system makes use of a Nordic nRF24L01 transceiver
to facilitate bi-directional half duplex communication. The Nordic receiver includes a
robust transmission protocol capable of error detection and retransmission of data at a
maximum data rate of 2Mb/s. In order to extend the range of the 0dBm transmitter a
bi-directional 2.4GHz amplifier is attached to the output of the transceiver. It should
be noted that bi-directional amplifiers are particularly costly.
The telemetry system also includes the persistent storage of the PSAS flight computer
although it is connected to the main node via a separate USB connection. Persistent
storage is facilitated through the use of a USB flash disk.
System and Firmware
As mentioned above the LV2b uses a real-time Linux operating system called eCOS
on its main node. This is a questionable design choice, given that it is necessary for
the flight computer to be reliable for mission success. The eCOS Linux kernel makes
use of a pre-emptive task scheduler [12]. A pre-emptive scheduler entails each task
being assigned a priority. Tasks with a higher priority are then able to pre-empt tasks
of a lower priority, that is, they are able to take over the CPU from the lower priority
task. If this type of scheduler architecture is not carefully designed and thoroughly
tested it can lead to a failure called a priority inversion. This entails a low priority task
locking a shared a resource with a mutex and then blocking a higher priority task from
pre-empting CPU and utilising that resource. A mutex, or mutual exclusion object, is
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uses a resource it locks the mutex to indicate that the resource is currently in use, thus
blocking other threads from using the resource. One example of such a failure was
on NASA’s Mars Pathfinder mission. In this case a low priority task locked a shared
resource with a mutex. In doing so it blocked a higher priority task that required the
resource. The low priority task was then pre-empted by a medium priority task that
did not require access to the shared resource. This delayed the low priority task from
completing, which in turn delayed the higher priority task. The watchdog timer then
detected that the high priority task had not been executed which led to a full system
reset [13].
The major issue with this scheduler architecture is simply that it requires a huge
amount of testing to be sure that all possible task combinations do not cause prior-
ity inversion or deadlock. In large complex systems it may be impossible to test the
system comprehensively [9]. It should be noted that there are a number of complex
solutions to the priority inversion problem, including for example using priority in-
heritance. This involves assigning the low priority task, that is locking the shared
resource, the highest possible waiting priority so that medium priority tasks are un-
able to pre-empt it. The primary issue with these solutions is that it is still difficult to
test every combination of tasks. It is also impossible to guarantee a precise execution
time for a task without elevating its priority above all other tasks.
A further potential problem in badly designed or insufficiently tested pre-emptive ar-
chitectures is process deadlock. This may occur for example in a circular wait situ-
ation. This entails a set of processes each waiting for the next process to release a
shared resource. So, for example, for the set of processes P1, P2, P3 if P2 is waiting
for P1 to release a resource, and P3 is waiting for P2, and P1 is waiting for P3 the
scheduler will be in a deadlocked state and unable to continue.
It should be apparent to the reader that in order to manage task priorities and to detect
or prevent deadlock situations a number of algorithms are required to run along-side
the scheduler. This significantly increases both code size and complexity [9]. This
increase in code size and complexity makes it more difficult to test properly a system












Lessons Learnt for the PSAS LV2b
The LV2b is substantially more complex and more capable than the RDAS flight com-
puter. A number of lessons have been learnt in analysis of the LV2b flight computer.
These include:
1. The ability of the master-slave architecture to achieve extensibility and modu-
larity.
2. The review of the communication buses in question has informed the selection
of possible communication buses for the SAAO flight computer.
3. The self calibration of the inertial measurement unit through the temperature
sensor was noted as something to be included in the SAAO flight computer.
4. The use of a backup battery pack for the recovery system was noted as some-
thing to be used in the SAAO. This is due to the fact that it helps to avoid a flight
failure in the case of a major failure on the flight computer.
5. The importance of the use of a co-operative scheduler in the design of reliable
time-critical embedded systems.
2.4 Conclusion
In summary of this chapter; we have analysed two projects of similar intent, the RDAS
flight computer and the PSAS LVb2 flight computer. Each flight computer has been
analysed for its strengths and weaknesses and from this analysis lessons to be taken
forward in the design of the SAAO flight computer have been noted. In the next chap-
ter we will analyse the requirements and constraints for the flight computer provided
by SAAO, breaking them down into the functions required. We will also present the












SAAO Requirements and Functional
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The following chapter presents the requirements for the SAAO flight computer pro-
vided by the South African Astronomical Observatory. These requirements are anal-
ysed and translated into the functions that are required of the flight computer. Fol-
lowing the presentation of the functions required of the flight computer, the testing
procedures are given. These test procedures are required to verify that each of the
functions has been successfully implemented.
3.2 SAAO Requirements













The Purpose of the Flight Computer
The purpose of the flight computer is to measure the performance of a sounding rocket
and to control key events all phases of flight. This includes measuring and recording
atmospheric and inertial data in-flight. Through the processing of this data the flight
computer detects in-flight events, such as apogee, and responds with the appropriate
action, such us the deployment of parachutes. The flight computer must have the
capacity to support additional payloads on the rocket, for example experiments.
Performance Requirements
Rocket Performance Measurements
R1. The flight computer should be able to take inertial measurements in 6 degrees
of freedom. It should also be able to measure tmospheric variables relevant to the
performance of the rocket, such as temperature and pressure. All of this information
should be used to determine the position of the rocket.
Detection of In-Flight Events
R2. The flight computer should be able to detect the following in-flight events:
• R2.1 - Launch
• R2.2 - Stage Burnout
• R2.3 - Separation
• R2.4 - Stage-Ignition
• R2.5 - Apogee












Ground Services and Status Indications
R3. It should be possible to communicate with and control the flight computer on the
launch pad.
R4. It should be possible to power the flight computer from an external power source
on the launch pad so that the battery life of the flight computer is not used up during
pre-launch preparations.
R5. The flight computer should give auditory feedback relating to its status on the
launch pad. Status information should also be continuously communicated to the
ground-station.
R6. The ground station should include a computer with the ability to send commands
to the flight computer and to receive data from the flight computer. Further, this com-
puter should be able to process, store and display this data in real time.
Flight Computer Systems
R7. The flight computer should be able to manage and provide power to all its sub-
systems.
R8. The flight computer should be able to store all the measured flight data on board
for later retrieval.
R9. The flight computer should be capable of triggering a minimum of five igniters in
response to in-flight events.
R10. The flight computer should include a telemetry capability to allow for real-time
data transmission to the ground station and for ground station control of the flight
computer.
R11. The flight computer should include an independent flight termination capability
with a manual override. This is to prevent the rocket from crashing in civilian areas













R12. The flight computer should allow for expansion and the inclusion of mission-
specific payloads.
Stresses and Constraints
R13. The flight computer should be able to perform its functions within the following
parameters and constraints:
• R13.1 - Size: The flight computer should fit into an electronics bay of a mini-
mum diameter of 60mm and a maximum length of 300mm.
• R13.2 - Mass: The flight computer should not exceed a mass of 500g including
its batteries.
• R13.3 - Power Usage: The flight computer should have enough battery life to
last a minimum of 100 minutes in nominal operating conditions. It should be
possible to switch out battery packs without disturbing the operation of the flight
computer.
• R13.4 - Acceleration: The flight computer should be able to operate up to a
maximum of ±50g acceleration.
• R13.5 - Temperature: The flight computer should be able to operate down to a
minimum temperature of -50◦C and a maximum of 80◦C.
• R13.6 - The flight computer must be electrically isolated from its surroundings
or grounded to the rocket
• R13.7 - The flight computer should be mechanically robust enough to survive
multiple installations and removals from the rocket payload bay.
• R13.8 - Noise Immunity: The flight computer should be designed to withstand












ation is difficult to decide upon given that it will fluctuate greatly, for example,
with proximity to cell phone towers.
Reliability and Safety Requirements
Robust Design
R14. The flight computer should be designed in such a way that a failure in one
subsystem does not cause a failure of the flight computer as a whole.
R15. The flight computer should be able to recover from program hardware or firmware
faults during flight to prevent mission failure.
System Redundancy
R16. Mission-critical subsystems should have some form of redundancy to prevent
them from becoming potential single-point failures.
Reliability
R17. The flight computer should detect and record flight events with a reliability of
above 95%.
R18. The flight computer should include error detection and correction capabilities in
its communication and data processing hardware or firmware.
Life Cycle Management Requirements
R19. Wherever possible standard components (COTS) and communication protocols
should be used to ensure that the lifespan of the flight computer is not cut short by an












R20. The flight computer should be modular and easily extensible in such a way as to
improve the lifespan of the flight computer.
R21. Finally the design of the flight computer must make it easy for future users to
update and change the firmware to suit their requirements.
Environmental Requirements
R22. Due to the inherently risky nature of rocket flight and the high probability that
the flight computer would be destroyed in a crash, the components used to construct
the flight computer should be Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (ROHS)
compliant wherever possible. This will prevent toxic substances from causing envi-
ronmental damage in the case of a rocket crash.
3.3 Functional Analysis
This section will break down SAAO’s flight computer requirements into the required
flight computer functions. This will aid in the production of a clear specification to




The following set of functions relate to the measurement of performance and atmo-
spheric variables during flight. For reference with the following functions, diagram





























F1 The flight computer must be able to measure ac-
celeration in 3 linear axes; X, Y and Z and 3
rotational axes; pitch, yaw and roll. This data
should be used calculate velocity and position.
The linear axes should have a maximum accel-
eration measurement range of ±200g in the Z-
axis and ±20g in the X and Y axes. The ro-
tational axes should have a minimum measure-
ment range of 300◦/s The measurement rate
should be a minimum of 200Hz.
R1
Pressure Measurement
F2 The flight computer should be able to measure
pressure relative to its launch point. This will
provide a second means of calculating altitude.
The rate at which the flight computer can mea-
sure pressure should be 200Hz.
R1
Position Measurement
F3 The flight computer should be able to take GPS
readings, preferably differential through the use
of a GPS receiver both at the ground station and
on the flight computer. This will provide a sec-
ond measure of position to null the cumulative














F4 The sensor is primarily to monitor the condi-
tions in which the flight computer is operating;




F5 The flight computer should be able to monitor
the current draw of each of its subsystems as
well as the voltage of the batteries. These mea-
surements should be at a minimum of 10Hz.
This information will allow the flight computer
to enter low-power modes in the case of low bat-
tery voltages. It will also allow the flight com-
puter to detect faulty subsystems when they use
too much power.
R5, R7
State and Functionality Monitoring
F6 The flight computer should be able to monitor
whether or not each of its subsystems are func-
tioning correctly. The state information should
be made available at the ground station. In the
case of the recovery system the status of the ig-
niters should be monitored, that is, whether the














F7 All of F1 - F6 should be stored in the flight com-
puter’s on board non-volatile memory. It must
be fast enough to store data in real time. The
flight computer will probably produce between
10 - 80kb/s of data, therefore for enough capac-
ity to store 100 minutes, a minimum of between
8 and 64 MB of storage is required.
R8, R16
In-Flight Data Transmission
F8 All of F1 - F6 should be transmitted by the
rocket to the ground station. The flight com-
puter should be able to send and receive data.
The data link should include error checking and
the capacity for the correction of errors. The
link should be fast enough to transmit all the
required data and to resend messages that are
corrupted. A range of 50km and data rate of a
minimum of (100kb/s) is expected.
R3, R10
3.5 Events














F9 The flight computer should be able to detect the
beginning of a flight so that it can start storing
and transmitting flight data. Launch may be de-
tected through means of a break-wire, a large,
sudden change in acceleration, a large change




F10 The flight computer should be able to detect
when a motor runs out of fuel so that the stage
may be separated from the rocket and a new
rocket motor stage ignited. This event will en-
tail a negative acceleration in the Z-axis due to
drag and gravity. It may therefore be detected
through inertial measurement. A manual over-
ride through the telemetry system in the case of














F11 After detecting stage burnout the flight com-
puter should be able to trigger a separation with
the burnt out motor stage. This event’s comple-
tion should be confirmed before a new motor
stage is ignited since premature ignition would
cause a major failure. Separation could be de-
tected via a break-wire or via manual override




F12 The flight computer should be able to detect
when a new rocket stage is ignited. This may
be detected by a sudden increase in accelera-
tion or a sudden increase in the rate of decrease
of pressure and or temperature.
R2.4
Apogee Detection
F13 The flight computer should be able to detect
when the rocket reaches the apex of its flight
so that it can trigger the recovery systems. De-
tection may be through an increase in pressure
measurement, through the use of a timer sys-
tem, an increase in acceleration in the Earth’s
negative Z-axis or zero velocity in the Earth’s Z-
axis or by manual override through the teleme-














F14 The flight computer needs to be able to detect
the landing of the rocket. This may be done by
measuring zero velocity, a static pressure mea-
surement approximately the same as the launch
pressure, or via a large acceleration in the pos-
itive Z-axis. Once detected the flight computer
should turn on a tracking beacon.
R2.6
Dangerous Trajectory Detection
F15 The flight computer should be able to detect
a trajectory that is outside a predetermined set
of safe trajectories. One method of doing this
would be to compare the horizontal displace-
ment of the rocket with some predetermined
radius outside of which the rocket’s trajectory
would be considered dangerous. This should
also include the ability to manually set the tra-
jectory as dangerous through the telemetry sys-
















F16 The flight computer should be able to fire a
launch igniter at the command of the ground
station. The igniter driver circuit should be able
to provide 3A for a duration of 0.5s. Further,
hardware and software locks are required to en-




F17 Having detected stage burnout, the flight com-
puter should be able to fire a stage separa-
tion charge igniter to separate the burnt out
stage from the rocket. The igniter driver circuit
should be able to provide 3A for a duration of
0.5s. Further, hardware and software locks are
required to ensure that the igniter does not fire
due to a fault or false detection.
R2.2, R9
New Stage Ignition
F18 The flight computer should be able to ignite
each subsequent stage of the rocket. The igniter
driver circuit for each stage should be able to
provide 3A for a duration 0.5s. Further, hard-
ware and software locks are required to ensure
















F19 The ground station should be able to display
data received from the rocket in real time, be-
fore and during flight. This should be through
a ground station graphical user interface con-
nected to the ground station telemetry. The
data display should include data processing to
ensure the data displayed is in a format the
user can understand. Further, there should be
a graphical illustration of the trajectory of the
rocket in comparison to some simulated ex-
pected trajectory to provide the user with clear




F20 The ground station should provide the user with
the ability to send commands to the flight com-
puter via the telemetry link. This is to provide
the user with the ability to react with manual
overrides in the case of failed detections or to














Auditory Feedback on Launchpad
F21 When on the ground the flight computer should
provide an audible indication of its status to pro-
vide the user with clear information with re-
gards to its operational status.
R5
Table 3.1: Functional analysis with reference to SAAO requirements.
3.7 Testing
In order to meet the requirements of SAAO and to ensure that the flight computer will
operate under the conditions of rocket flight given by SAAO, the flight computer shall
be tested using the process outlined in this section of the specification. The following




According to the NASA Dynamic Environmental Criteria handbook the purpose of a
qualification test is “...to demonstrate with margin that a hardware design is adequate
to perform as are required throughout the mission (pre-flight and flight) environmental
exposures.” [14]
Failure of these tests is incurred if and only if the failure is the result of a design
deficiency. Failures that are due for example to workmanship error are not relevant













According to the NASA Dynamic Environmental Criteria acceptance tests are carried
out on hardware that has passed a set of qualification tests. The purpose of these
tests is to “...detect workmanship errors and/or material defects in the manufacture
and assembly of the hardware, and to demonstrate that the hardware is representative
of the qualified design.”
Failure here is only incurred if the failure is due to a workmanship error or a material
defect. Due to the fact that the hardware has undergone and passed qualification tests
there should be no design faults.
Protoflight Tests
A protoflight test is a test applied to one-of-a-kind flight test hardware in order to meet
the goals of both qualification and acceptance testing.
A failure may be due to both design deficiencies and workmanship or material de-
ficiencies. In the case of workmanship and material deficiencies the fault should be
repaired if possible and the test continued.
Tests to Be Performed
Qualification Tests
Design Verification Tests In order to validate that the design of the hardware func-
tions according to the requirements in this specification the flight computer should be
placed in an environment where flight conditions are simulated. The performance of
the flight computer should be measured and recorded for analysis.
The following process should be followed for validation:
1. First, the flight computer should be tested in ideal conditions. This should be












the ability of the communication bus to handle all the data expected during a
flight. This may be achieved through the use of In-the-Loop testing. In-the-
Loop testing involves modelling the expected inputs to the flight computer in
order to simulate a flight. The modelled inputs are then put through the flight
computer and the response of the flight computer is recorded. The performance
of the flight computer in this simulated flight should be measured and analysed
to determine if the design meets the specification.
2. Once the design has been verified in the ideal case the ideal model should be
altered to include measurement noise and non-ideal trajectories. The limits of
the design to withstand noise and non-ideal flight conditions should be charac-
terised.
3. Once this has been achieved the above tests should be rerun under the envi-
ronmental conditions expected during flight. Flight simulation through In-the-
Loop testing shall be carried out along with the following tests derived from
MIL-STD-1540C [15]:
• Temperature stress testing should be carried out by subjecting the flight com-
puter to the temperature shock to be expected during flight. A change of up to
70◦C over 60 seconds is to be expected. The performance of the flight computer
should also be tested at the extremes of its operational temperature. That is
down to -50◦C and up to 85◦C. In-the-Loop simulations should be run multiple
times to characterise fully the performance at these extremes.
• Vibration testing should be carried out to ensure the flight computer can operate
over long periods of time under the expected vibration from the rocket mo-
tor. In-the-Loop simulation testing should be carried out in a vibration chamber
multiple times to ensure operation in these conditions.
• Acceleration testing should be carried out to ensure the flight computer can
operate in a sustained acceleration environment of up to 50g over prolonged
periods longer then the expected burn phases of the rocket motor.
• Shock testing should be carried out to ensure that the flight computer can operate












• Vacuum testing should be carried out to ensure that the flight computer’s elec-
tronic components do not out-gas. The vacuum should be lower pressure then
0.1kPa, which is the atmospheric pressure at 50km.
Acceptance Tests
To find workmanship defects, voltage level tests, continuity tests, and visual inspec-
tion should be carried out on each flight computer. Workmanship faults may also be
discovered by simulation testing each flight computer in the ideal case and verifying
each individual function.
Protoflight Tests
Once the flight computer has been qualified, a number of flight tests should be carried
out to ensure the flight computer’s operation in the real world environment. In each
case the flight computer should be paired with a second commercial flight computer
which should be responsible for the control of the rocket. The flight computer should
be tested to verify correct operation and correct detection of events in flight. The data
should be analysed and compared to the data from the commercial flight computer to
verify the operation of the flight computer.
Once several successful flights have been undertaken the flight computer should be
placed in a rocket on its own. This final validation of the operation of the flight com-
puter should only be done once the tester is certain of the operation of the flight com-
puter based on the previous testing.
Testing Procedures
The following section details the procedures for verifying that the flight computer
operates within the constraints set out by SAAO in requirement R13. It also includes













R13.1 - Size The flight computer should be able to fit into a 60mm diameter cylin-
der with a maximum length of 300mm. Therefore to verify this constraint the flight
computer should be mounted within a 60 mm diameter cyclinder.
R13.2 - Mass In order to verify the mass of the flight computer and its batteries, the
flight computer and its batteries should be weighed using a standard laboratory scale.
R13.3 - Power Usage In order to verify that the flight computer is able to operate
nominally for 100 minutes, the flight computer should be run on a bench for a 100
minute period. The operation of the flight computer should be logged for the duration
of the test to ensure that it continuous to operate nominally for the full 100 minutes.
R13.4 - Acceleration In order to verify the flight computer’s ability to operate
through large acceleration spikes, the flight computer should be subjected to acceler-
ation shocks. This may be in the form of drop testing. The flight computer’s nominal
operation should be verified before and after the test.
R13.5 - Temperature In order to verify the operation of the flight computer within
the temperature limits set out by SAAO, the flight computer should be placed in a
temperature chamber capable of producing the temperatures set out in R13.5. The
flight computer should be monitored by logging its operation. This log must then be
analysed to ensure the flight computer operated nominally over the duration of the
test.
The flight computer should also be subjected to temperature shock, that is rapid changes
in temperature from 25◦C down to the minimum operation temperature of -80◦C over
a period of one minute. The temperature should then by increased back to 25◦C over a
period of 5 minutes. This is to simulate the change in temperature over the duration of
a rocket flight. The flight computer should be monitored to ensure nominal operation












R13.8 - Noise Immunity In order to verify the flight computer’s immunity to noise,
the flight computer should be monitored for nominal operation in an area with high
levels of electro-magnetic radiation. One potential test location could be next to a
cell phone sub-station. The flight computer should be tested over a duration of 100
minutes.
Another likely source of electro-magnetic radiation is from tracking radars at a test
range. One potential method of simulating the electro-magnetic radiation from a radar
would be to attach a directional antenna to a signal generator and to aim it at the flight
computer. The test could be run in different frequency bands and with varying power
levels to test the effect of the electro magnetic radiation on the flight computer.
R17 - Reliability In order to ensure that the event detection algorithm is able to
detect flight events with a reliability of above 95%, the algorithm should be tested
using datasets from actual rocket flights.
Further Environmental Testing The flight computer should be tested for nominal
operation in a vibration chamber. The vibration test should be operated for up to 30
seconds at a time. This duration is well above the normal burn time of a solid rocket
motor.
F1 - Inertial Measurement F1 states that the flight computer is required to have in-
ertial measurement in six degrees of freedom. In order to test this, the flight computer
should be subjected to a known acceleration in each axis individually. The measure-
ment should then be compared to the known acceleration to ascertain whether or not
the inertial measurement is operating correctly.
F2 - Pressure Measurement F2 states that the flight computer is required to be able
to measure pressure. In order to test this, the flight computer should be tested over
a range of known pressures. The measurements from the on-board pressure sensor
should be compared to the known pressure in order to ascertain whether or not the












F3 - Position Measurement F3 states that the flight computer is required to be able
to measure the position of the rocket through both GPS and inertial means. Firstly, the
on-board GPS system should be tested for its ability to lock with GPS satellites in an
environment similar to that of a launch site. Once lock has been verified, the position
read-out of the GPS system should be compared to that of a known position in order
to ascertain whether or not the GPS system is operating correctly.
Secondly, position derived from inertial measurement should be tested. Before these
tests can begin the sensors should be characterised and calibrated. The flight com-
puter should be displaced a known distance without any rotational displacement. The
output of the inertial measurement unit should then be compared to the known dis-
placement to ascertain whether or not position has been correctly calculated. Once
linear displacement calculations have been verified, a rotational displacement should
be included in the known displacement. Once again the output should be compared
to the known displacement to ascertain whether or not the inertial measurement unit’s
output is correct.
F4 - Temperature Measurement F4 states that the flight computer is required to
be able to measure temperature. In order to test this the flight computer’s ability to
measure temperature, the flight computer should be placed in a temperature chamber
at a known temperature. The output of the on-board temperature sensor should then be
compared to the known temperature to ascertain whether or not the sensor is properly
calibrated and operating correctly. This test should be repeated over the whole range
of temperatures that R13 requires the flight computer to operate in, with a resolution
of 10◦C.
F5 - Power Measurement F5 states that the flight computer is required to measure
both the current consumption of the individual nodes as well as the voltage levels
of the batteries. In order to test the measurement of current consumption the flight
computer’s power channels should be connected to dummy loads to ensure the con-
sumption is stable. The current through each node should then be measured with a












measurement to ascertain whether or not the on-board sensors are operating correctly.
In order to test the correct operation of the voltage measurement, the flight computer
should be connected to batteries. The voltage of the batteries should be measured
using a multimeter. The known voltage should then be compared to the measured
voltage to ascertain whether or not the on-board sensors are operating correctly.
F6 and F21 - Operation Monitoring and Status Indication F6 and F21 require
that the flight computer is able to monitor its status, that is, whether or not each of the
nodes are operating correctly. It is also required to indicate its current status audibly.
In order to test this, the flight computer should be operated normally to ascertain
whether or not it is able to detect and indicate normal operation. A node should
then be disconnected from the CAN bus, and the audible status should be monitored
to ascertain whether or not there is a change in the status notification indicating a
malfunctioning node.
F7 - Data Storage and Transmission F7 states that the flight computer is required
to be able to store all measured data, on-board, in non-volatile memory. This stored
data should also be transmitted via telemetry to a ground-station computer.
In order to verify the storage of data in the on-board non-volatile memory, a known
data sequence should be stored in the memory through the flight computer. This data
should then be read out through the flight computer. The read-out data should be
compared to the input data in order to ascertain whether or not the data is correctly
stored in the non-volatile memory.
This same data known data set should be transmitted over the telemetry link. The
transmitted data should be compared to the received data on the ground-station side in
order to ascertain whether or not the telemetry link is operating correctly.
R17 and F9 to F15 - Event Detection Functions F9 to F15 as well as Requirement
R17 state that the flight computer should be able to detect in-flight events. In order












computer’s detection algorithms. The detection of in-flight events by the detection
algorithms should be compared to the known events in the flight data.
F16 to F18 - Event Initiation F16 to F18 state that the flight computer is required
to be able to initiate events in response to detecting events. In order to test its ability
to initiate events, the flight computer should be connected to dummy igniters. The
dummy igniters should include a resistive load capable of indicating that enough cur-
rent is being provided. One example of this would be to use an incandescent light bulb.
In this scenario, if enough current is provided, the light bulb would turn on. The event
triggering and firing mechanisms should be tested with the dummy load and the load
should be monitored to ascertain whether or not the mechanisms operate correctly.
F19 - Data Display F19 states that the flight comput r system is to include a ground-
station graphical user interface, which displays the flight computer’s data in real-time.
In order to test the GUI’s ability to display data, the flight computer should be con-
nected to the GUI and operated normally. The graphical user interface should then be
monitored for its ability to display the data.
F20 - In-Flight Commands F20 states that the ground station GUI is required to be
able to transmit commands to the flight computer. In order to test this the flight com-
puter should be connected to the ground station GUI. Commands should then be sent
from the GUI to the flight computer. The flight computer should then be monitored
for a response to the given command to ascertain whether or not this function operates
correctly.
3.8 Conclusion
In summary of this chapter, we have presented the SAAO requirements for a rocket
flight computer. The SAAO requirements were then analysed by breaking them down












the flight computer meets the requirements given by SAAO. In the following chapter
we will present the design of the SAAO flight computer based on the requirements,














The following chapter presents the design of the SAAO flight computer. Each design
choice is referenced back to the requirement or function that necessitated the design
feature. The chapter begins with the selection of the architecture of the flight com-
puter. This is followed by the detailed design of the flight computer based on the
architecture selected. This includes, the selection of and design of hardware, the de-
sign of the operating system and the design of the algorithms required to process the
data.
4.2 Flight Computer Architecture Design
The choice of architecture for this flight computer is critical to facilitate the modularity
and extensibility requirements of the user, namely the requirements R12 and R20.











4.2. FLIGHT COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
Architecture Review and Selection
Monolithic Architecture
As shown in Figure 4.1, this architecture makes use of a single processor capable of
controlling all the features of the system. The advantage of this architecture is that it
requires the smallest number of components and the smallest amount of circuit board
space of all the available architectures. Both of these are important points to consider
bearing in the mind the budget and space constraints of the project as per R13. The
biggest limitation of this architecture is its inflexibility with regards to the extensibil-
ity of the system. Further, redundancy is problematic given that the single processor
is a single-point failure for the system. If the main processor fails all the functions of
the system fail. When considering the modularity and extensibility requirements of
SAAO, the limitations of this architecture render it incapable of fulfilling the require-
ments.
Interconnected Systems Architecture - Minimum Microcontrollers
A slightly altered version of the monolithic architecture is shown in Figure 4.2. It
reduces the dependence of the system on a single processor. The improvement of
this architecture over the monolithic architecture is the elimination of a single-point
of failure on the circuit board. Functions are distributed over as many processors as
are required. However, the functions are not completely independent of each other,
so a failure in one processor would still not have a minimal affect on the system. The
major drawback of this approach is still the lack of complete modularity. Although
the functions are separated over a number of processors, there is still no standard
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4.2. FLIGHT COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
Distributed Architecture - No Master
The distributed architecture shown in Figure 4.3 achieves complete modularity by
distributing each flight computer function to an independent node. There is no master
controlling node; each node carries out its function independent of the other nodes.
Each node transmits and receives only the data relevant to its operation. The advantage
of this architecture is that failure of one node has a minimum effect on the other nodes.
Also, it becomes easy to add new functions to the system as a new node need only use
the same power and communication protocol as provided to the other nodes. The
major drawback of this architecture is that there is no control of the individual nodes
in response to system status or events as outlined in F6. For example, if one node were
to start to malfunction, there is no other node that could turn off the broken node. A
second drawback is the large component count and the large amount of circuit board
space required for this architecture.
Master-Slave Architecture
The master-slave architecture as shown in Figure 4.4, incorporates the modularity of
the distributed architecture with the control of the monolithic architecture. In this
architecture we have a single master node monitoring and controlling the operation
of the slave nodes. Each slave node carries out a specific function independent of
the other slave nodes. Each node transmits and receives only the data it requires
from the communication bus. The major advantages of this architecture are that it
achieves the modularity and extensibility of the distributed architecture while retain-
ing autonomous control of the individual nodes in response to their status and/or the
requirements of the system at that time. The major drawback of this approach is the
large component count and the large amount of circuit board space required.
Architecture Selection
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4.2. FLIGHT COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
• The ability of the Master-Slave architecture to achieve the modularity and ex-
tensibility requirements of SAAO, as set out in Requirements R12 and R20.
• The ability of the Master-Slave architecture to control autonomously the func-
tions of the flight computer by monitoring their states. This is linked to the
requirements of function F6.
Communication Bus Review and Selection
The selection of the data bus is essential to fulfilling the requirements for data integrity
highlighted in requirement R18. Further, the need for a standard ell-known commu-
nication protocol is illustrated in requirements R12, R19 and function F6. That is, the
communication protocol cannot be a rare obscure protocol if it is to be easy for users
to extend the flight computer.
I2C
I2C is a bus communication protocol first introduced by Philips. It is a two-wire
protocol including a clock line and a data line [11]. Each node on the bus is addressed
with a 7-bit address, though larger addressing schemes exist. The 7-bit address space
limits the number of nodes that may be added to the bus to 128. Nodes may be either
a master or a slave on the bus. It is possible to have more than one master node on the
bus, in which case bus arbitration is carried out by giving the master node addressing
the slave with the lowest value address priority. The bus generally operates up to a
maximum rate of 100kb/s, however variations exist that operate above 1Mb/s. The
protocol does not include any data checking or resending of messages. It is up to the
user to include this functionality on top of the protocol. However it should be noted
that adding this functionality in firmware will increase processor overhead. Given that
data integrity is a requirement as per requirement R18, this is an important point as
this functionality must be added. This would then increase the power consumption
of the flight computer because the extra processing overhead would be added to each











4.2. FLIGHT COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
RS-485
RS-485 is a communication standard defined by EIA [16]. It uses a differential pair to
transmit signals on the bus. The bus requires 3 lines, including the differential pair and
a reference voltage. The fact that RS-485 uses a differential method of transmission
means that it is far more noise resistant then I2C. Further, this noise immunity enables
the bus to transmit at a much higher data rate; in this case, 35Mb/s if the nodes are
within 12m. A maximum of 32 nodes may be added to the bus. The major drawback
of this standard is that it does not implement any communication protocol, it is just
a hardware standard. This means that all functionality must be implemented by the
user in firmware. Therefore as with I2C this makes it more difficult to fulfil the data
integrity power consumption requirements.
Controller Area Network
The controller area network (CAN) bus was initially design by Bosch for applications
in the automotive industry. It was designed to enable microcontrollers to communicate
with each other without the need for a host computer [17]. Communication is done
over a differential bus giving CAN a high resistance to external noise as with RS-
485. Each node is given an address of up to 16 bits. This means CAN is capable of
supporting a very large number of nodes. Over short distances communication at up
to 1Mb/s is possible. The CAN protocol implements a transfer layer, in hardware,
that includes features such as error detection, message acknowledgement, message
retransmission and bus arbitration. These features are well suited to fulfilling the data
integrity and power consumption requirements highlighted above.
Communication Bus Selection
From the above communication buses the CAN bus has been selected as the commu-
nication bus most capable of fulfilling the requirements set out above. This is due to
its use of differential communication, and the implementation of error correction and











4.2. FLIGHT COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
Microcontroller Review and Selection
Microcontrollers are available from a wide range of companies such as Atmel, Mi-
crochip Technology, Freescale, NXP and Texas Instruments. Each of these companies
supports the communication bus standard selected above as well as numerous com-
munication standards that are anticipated to be required in the course of this project.
These include communication standards such as Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI).
However, the support of the University of Cape Town for Freescale Microcontrollers
means that the writer is most familiar with Freescale devices. This, coupled with the
ability of Freescale’s devices to fulfil the needs of this project, has led to a Freescale
device being selected as the node standard. The device chosen to power the nodes in
the flight computer is the Coldfire V1 MCF51JM128 [18].
Pin Header
In order to facilitate modularity set out in requirements R12, R20 and R21, a common
bus connection is required. What follows is the arrangement of the signal lines on the
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Each of the power channels in the above list provides 5V and supports a maximum
current of 200mA.
Basic Node Building Blocks
The common bus connection described entails that certain common hardware blocks
will be required on each of the nodes of the flight computer. This section lays out the
common hardware blocks required for any node on the flight computer bus.
As shown in Figure 4.5, each node requires a minimum of a single microcontroller
capable of operating at or under 5V and capable of using the Controller Area Network
(CAN) protocol. Further, each node requires a CAN transceiver to convert the serial
data stream from the microcontroller to the differential signals used on the CAN bus.
Each node requires some method of power channel selection which may be as simple
as a set of jumpers. Each node may make use of any of the logic signals provided on
the pin header. Finally, each node has a JTAG socket for programming, and provides
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Figure 4.6: Block diagram of the main node [19].
4.3 Node Design
The Main Node
Figure 4.6 illustrates the features included on the Main Node.
The main node is the master node on the CAN Bus; it controls all the other nodes,
including supplying power to each node and monitoring each node’s status and power
consumption. This node also controls the transmission of data to the ground by amal-
gamating data from the slave nodes into a data frame with a time stamp and then
forwarding this frame to the telemetry node for transmission.
Power Management Unit
In order to fulfil requirements R7, R12 and function F6 the Power Management Unit












Current and Voltage Measurement The PMU has the ability to measure the volt-
age level of both the main and the backup battery pack. Based on this information
estimates may be made of the remaining operational time of the flight computer. Ac-
tion may be taken by the PMU to save battery life in the case of a very low battery
voltage. The PMU is also able to monitor the current consumption each of the power
channels.
Channel Switching The PMU has the ability switch the power channels on and off.
It does this through the use of a bank of high side switches. If the PMU detects that
a slave node is drawing too much current it may switch it off through this function. It
also provides a means of saving battery life when necessary.
Batteries The flight computer is designed to run with two Li-ion battery packs. Each
battery pack must be capable of providing 5V for 100 minutes. Given that there are six
power channels, and each power channel is limited to a maximum current of 200mA,
this requirement necessitates a battery with a capacity of approximately 2000mAh.
The choice of this type of battery is based on its specific energy. Li-ion batteries
have a very high specific energy. This means that they can store a lot more electrical
energy per unit mass than, for example, a lead acid battery. This property makes Li-ion
batteries well suited for use in the SAAO flight computer given the weight constraint
of the SAAO user requirements.
The batteries are charged through two independent Li-ion battery chargers on the
PMU. Charging is enabled when the flight computer is connected to external power.
The charging status of the batteries is passed from the PMU to the microcontroller so
that the user can see when the batteries are charged.
Power Regulation The 5V required by the flight computer is provided by a low
drop-out 5V regulator on the PMU. It was decided to use a linear regulator despite its
inefficiencies due to the fact that it was unclear how much effect the switching noise
from a switch mode power supply would have. However, in future revisions of the












nodes that require 3.3V regulate the 5V signal down to 3.3V independently through
the use of low drop-out regulators.
Data Storage
The main node is the centre for data storage on the flight computer, to this end a micro-
SD card has been placed on this node. The reason for the use of SD cards as persistent
storage was the ability to increase easily the size of the storage. Further, it is easy to
remove the SD card to retrieve the persistent data should the rest of the flight computer
be damaged in some way. The limitation of this method of storage is that it is not as
mechanically robust as an IC soldered onto the circuit board. However steps may be
taken to secure the micro SD card as necessary. For example, in the case of the SAAO
flight computer provision has been made to bolt the SD card into place.
Status Indication
A buzzer has been placed on the main node to fulfil the requirements of function
F21. It has been placed on the main node because the main node will manage all the
other nodes. This node will therefore be the place to which status information is sent.
The main node will make the status of the flight computer known to the user audibly
through the use of this buzzer.
Extra Power Connectors
Two power jumpers are provided to the users in case they wish to power external
components, such as a tracking beacon.
Recovery Node
Figure 4.7 shows a diagram of the recovery node.

























Igniter Channels The recovery node has six independent igniter channels, each ca-
pable of providing 3A for 0.5s. This is in fulfilment of requirement R9. Each channel
may only be fired a single time, and only one channel may be fired at a time. The
current is measured on each channel to monitor and limit the current consumption of
that channel.
Igniter Interlocks The firing of the igniter channels is controlled by a number of
interlocks. The following process must be followed in order to fire an igniter channel.
1. First the user must set the arm enable logic signal high.
2. Next the fire enable line on the recovery node should be set to a logic high.
3. Next the user needs to select an igniter channel and enable it with a logic high.
4. Finally the user needs to issue the fire command via a logic high on the fire line.
Only with all the other interlocks at a logic high will this command work.
The reason for this complicated procedure is the safety of the users. These interlocks
eliminate any accidental firings of igniter channels.
Independent Power Supply
Due to the fact that the operation of the recovery system is crucial to the successful
flight of the rocket, the recovery node has been given its own independent backup
power supply. In the event of a power failure from the main node the recovery node
will switch to the backup power supply. The power supply to the recovery node in-
cludes current and voltage sensing of the supply and the ability to charge the battery












Figure 4.8: Block diagram of the GPS node.
Status Indication and External User Control
In order to provide the user with a clear indication of which igniter channels are armed
and to provide the user with the ability to control mechanically which igniters can fire,
the user has been provided with a set of jumpers and indicator LEDs. This is primarily
for use as a safety measure when working on the flight computer on the ground.
GPS Node
Figure 4.8 shows a diagram of the GPS node.
The following are the features found on the GPS node:
COTs GPS
The GPS node makes use of a single COTs GPS receiver. This does not meet the
performance requirements laid out in requirement R13. However, it was decided that
the design of a GPS receiver that would operate within the constraints of SAAO was
outside of the scope of this dissertation. This was due to the cost and the time it would
take to design a GPS receiver capable of operating within the SAAO constraints during













The GPS node provides a visual indication of the number of GPS satellites to which
the node is currently locked. This is primarily for testing and integration of the flight
computer with the rocket body to ensure that the configuration of the user’s antennas
allows for GPS lock.
Telemetry Node
Figure 4.9 shows a diagram of the telemetry node.
Frequency of Operation
ISM Band Selection Although there is now a telemetry band in the C band, at the
time of the design of the telemetry module this band was not available. Further, there
are no easily available, off-the-shelf integrated circuits that operate at this frequency.
This makes designing for this frequency much more complex and so outside the scope
of this dissertation.
The main reason for only considering the ISM bands is the availability of off-the-shelf
integrated circuits that operate at these frequencies.
There are three main considerations in the analysis of the ISM bands. Firstly, the free
space path loss of the frequency which effects how much power is required to trans-
mit over long distances. Secondly, the available data rates at the frequencies under
consideration. The telemetry module requires a data rate high enough to deal with
the expected data from the flight computer with margin to handle re-transmissions for
error correction. Finally, the transmission protocols available in the bands are consid-
ered. It is preferable that error checking and correction is implemented in hardware.
This is because if this is implemented in firmware on the telemetry node processor
it will increase the processor overhead on telemetry node processor. This in turn in-
creases the power consumption of the node.


































were considered due to the complexity of designing for higher frequencies.
433MHz The 433MHz ISM band is probably the most commonly used band for
amateur rocketry. The availability of simple transceivers and the relative simplicity
of designing for the 433MHz band is a great advantage here. A number of compa-
nies, including Nordic Semiconductors, Radiometrix and Texas Instruments, produce
devices that operate at this frequency. The devices tend to be simple with little or no
transmission protocol. The data rates tend to be in the range of 10-100kbps. The main
advantage of this band is the low free space path loss at this frequency.
2.4GHz The 2.4GHz band provides a range of powerful transceivers capable of data
rates up to 2Mbps. Transceivers are available from companies such as Texas Instru-
ments and Nordic Semiconductors. The devices in this band tend to have more compli-
cated transmission protocols, including cyclic redundancy checking and error induced
retransmission. The main drawbacks of this band are the power limitations of the ISM
band and the high free space path loss relative to the 433MHz band.
Band Selection The band selected for the telemetry node is the 2.4GHz band. This
is due to the availability of transceivers that implement error correction and message
retransmission in their transmission layer. This selection is in aid of meeting require-
ments R13.3 and R18. Further, the transceivers in this band are capable of data rates
up to 2Mbps. These data rates are capable of managing both the data load from the
flight computer and added load imposed by the retransmission of messages.
Architecture
As shown in Figure 4.9, the telemetry node operates in a half-duplex mode through a
switching architecture [20]. The reason for the switching architecture is to allow the
addition of a power amplifier output stage and a low noise amplifier input stage. The
switches are controlled by a logic signal from the transceiver which also controls their












RF Component S11 (dB) S21 (dB) Isolation (dB)
PA -25.763 21.189
LNA -22.248 22.409
SPDT -19.7 -0.35 -26
Table 4.1: Simulated RF output stage S parameters.
The RF section of the telemetry node is separated from the digital section of the
telemetry node. This is to ensure a minimum amount of noise transfer from the digital
circuitry to the RF circuitry.
Devices from both Texas Instruments and Nordic Semiconductors were considered.
Both companies provide transceivers with data rates up to 2Mbps, and transmission
protocols capable of error correction and packet retransmission. However, due to
the ease of availability of the Nordic Semiconductors devices in South Africa it was
decided that they should be used. The device chosen for the Telemetry module is the
nRF24L01+ [21].
Performance
The amplifiers used in the output and input stage of the telemetry node were simulated
using Agilent’s Gensys. The power amplifier selected for the flight computer is the
Avago MGA-83563 [22]. It is a 3.3V 23dB power amplifier suitable for the modulation
type used in the telemetry node. The low-noise amplifier is an Avago MGA-86563 5V
20dB low-noise amplifier [23]. The following table shows the simulated performance
of the amplifier configuration. To see the simulated S11, S21, curves refer to the
appendices. The expected results for the SPDT are taken from the data sheet [24].
Link Budget
Table 4.1 shows the expected performance of the RF output stage of the telemetry
node. Table 4.2 shows the parameters required to calculate a simple link budget. The
antenna on the flight computer side is assumed to be an omni-directional antenna with













Transceiver Power 0 dBm
Simulated PA Gain 21.189 dB
Receiver Sensitivity at 1Mbps -85 dBm
Antenna Gain 15 dBi
Simulated LNA Gain 22.409 dB
Simulated SPDT Power Drop 1.4 dB
Table 4.2: Link Budget Parameters
gain of 15dBi. The value for simulated SPDT power drop is the expected drop across
four switches given the architecture shown in Figure 4.9. The maximum possible
range with these parameters in rocket flight would be approximately 10km.
Inertial Measurement Unit
Figure 4.10 shows a diagram of the inertial measurement unit.
The following are the features found on the inertial measurement unit.
Linear Acceleration Measurement The inertial measurement unit provides mea-
surement of acceleration in the X, Y and Z axes. In the Z-axis two accelerometers are
provided, one with a very large range of ±200g and the other with a smaller range
of ±20g. This is due to the fact that the accelerometer with the smaller range has
a much higher measurement resolution over its range. This is useful for the flight
phases where there is no motor burn as it allows a more accurate measurement of
smaller accelerations.
Rotational Acceleration Measurement Rotational acceleration measurement is pro-
vided for three rotation axes, that is, pitch, yaw and roll. The SAAO has specified that
their rockets will not be spin stabilised. Therefore rotational acceleration measure-

























Pressure Measurement The inertial measurement unit provides a single absolute
pressure transducer. The sensor is able to measure the pressure down to 0±0.8kPa .
The reason for selecting a sensor with this range is to ensure that the pressure trans-
ducer does not limit the maximum operational altitude of the inertial measurement
unit.
Temperature Measurement Temperature measurement is provided on the inertial
measurement unit. It is capable of a range of -40 to 105 ◦C. The temperature sen-
sor has been placed on the inertial measurement unit in order to provide a means of
temperature calibrating the inertial measurement unit. It is the objective of the tem-
perature sensor to measure the ambient temperature in which the inertial measurement
unit operates.
Data Processing
The inertial measurement unit uses a linear constant gain Kalman filter on the pressure
and acceleration data in order to calculate altitude. A second filter processes the rota-
tional acceleration together with the linear acceleration data in order to determine the
attitude of the rocket. This is done to provide a more accurate altitude measurement
by converting the acceleration of the rocket into the Earth’s reference frame.
GPS measurements are provided to the inertial measurement unit to reduce position
error caused by position calculations based on inertial measurements. The data are to
be fused using the Kalman filter.
Outputs
The inertial measurement unit provides outputs on the serial bus as well as providing
a number of timer channel outputs. These could be used to control servo motors
gimballing a rocket motor, or adjusting fins. It is, however, beyond the scope of this













Figure 4.11 shows a diagram of the ground station.
The following are the features included on the ground station.
GPS
In order to provide differential GPS measurements a GPS receiver is required at the
ground station. The user will input the known position of the fixed ground station into
the flight computer. The known position will then be differenced with the measured
location of the ground station and the difference will be forwarded to the flight com-
puter. This approach assumes that the flight computer has lock with the same GPS
satellites as the ground station. In this way the GPS offset can be eliminated and a
much more accurate position measurement may be achieved.
Telemetry
The ground station has a telemetry node attached to it to facilitate communication with
the rocket section of the flight computer.
Data Processing
The ground station forwards data received via the telemetry link to a computer. The
computer handles all the data processing required in real time.
Graphical User Interface
The graphical user interface displays all the processed data to the user. This is done
in real time to enable the user to respond to in flight events or to override manually
the flight computer’s behaviour in-flight. The graphical user interface displays all the

























The firmware for the flight computer uses a time-triggered architecture [9]. The reason
for the use of this architecture over a pre-emptive architecture is the increased relia-
bility and decreased system overhead. A more thorough treatment of this is given in
chapter 3.2.
The flight computer uses a shared clock scheduler in order to synchronise the clocks of
each of the nodes [9][10]. This provides a way to control communication on the CAN
bus in a time-triggered manner. The main node broadcasts a timing CAN message on
the CAN network. Each of the nodes on the network has a time triggered scheduler
that is triggered by the main node timing message. Thus the clocks of each of the
nodes are synchronised to the main node. Assuming a 1Mbps bus baud rate and an
8 byte CAN timing message there will be a delay between the main node trigger and
the slave node triggers of about 150µs. In order to reduce jitter on the slave nodes the
timing message sent by the main node is always the same. This prevents the bit stuffing
that the CAN protocol utilises from producing a variable length timing message [10].
The main node is therefore not able to transmit data with the timing message because
this would affect the number of stuffed bits in the timing message.
The slave nodes broadcast their data on the CAN network in a time-controlled manner.
This entails a separate time slot for transmission on the CAN bus for each node. Figure
4.12 shows a diagram of the transmission cycle of the flight computer. In the example
cycle shown all the nodes use their assigned message slot. This, however, is not always
the case.
The first CAN message is offset by 150µs because of the main node timing message
that precedes it. Each message on the CAN bus is given a 200µs slot. The transmission
cycle has a duration of 2ms, however, not every node transmits in every cycle. Table
4.3 shows the period of each node message. The recovery node only needs to transmit
a status update to the main node and this only requires a very low update rate. The
telemetry node only requires bus time when it has commands from the ground station
or when it has to update the main node on its status. Both of these functions are put












Figure 4.12: Block diagram of the CAN bus transmission cycle.
position updates at 1Hz, therefore it only requires bus time once every second. The
status update of the GPS node is put together with the position data message. Finally,
the inertial measurement node has an update rate of 500Hz. This is to provide high
resolution position, velocity and acceleration data which in turn enables a high time
resolution for event detection. Inertial measurement unit status updates and data are
broadcast onto the bus every transmission cycle. It should be noted that the trans-
mission layout detailed above leaves message space for future expansion of the flight
computer.
Figure 4.13 shows the scheduling of tasks on the inertial measurement node. It has
been chosen as an illustration because the period of its tasks are not widely distributed
in time. The main node scheduler runs at 1ms tick intervals. Each tick triggers a
CAN timing message to trigger all the slave nodes on the bus. Therefore the inertial
measurement unit is triggered every 1ms. The schedule has a total period of 2ms.
Each of the functions shown in the Figure 4.13 has a frequency of 500Hz, meaning
















Inertial Measurement Unit 500Hz
Master (Status) 1Hz
Table 4.3: This table shows the period of the node CAN messages.
message is transmitted using a different message identification number so that it does
not trigger the node timers.
Inertial Measurement Unit Algorithm
In order to detect events in the flight of the rocket accurately the information from the
various sensors on the inertial measurement must be combined and filtered. Figure
4.14 shows a block diagram of the inertial measurement unit algorithm.
First the sampled gyroscope and accelerometer data are combined to determine the
attitude of the rocket with respect to the Earth’s reference frame. This may be done
with either a Kalman filter or a Complimentary filter. The attitude data is then used
to convert the measured acceleration from the rocket’s reference frame to the Earth’s
reference frame. The acceleration values are then combined with the altitude values
derived from the pressure measurement [25] with a linear Kalman filter [26]. The filter
is made linear here by ignoring the effects of drag in the dynamic model of motion of
the rocket. This makes the filter less accurate, however, the advantage of this approach
is the simplicity of implementation of the filter. Due to the time constraints of this
project, simplicity is preferable.
The main purpose of the filter here is to determine the altitude of the rocket and thus
apogee, however, filtered acceleration and velocity data is also available through the
filter. This filtered data is passed to an event detection block for the detection of flight












Figure 4.13: Block diagram of the inertial measurement unit task schedule.













In summary of this chapter we have presented the design of the SAAO flight computer.
The design has covered both the hardware architecture, the firmware architecture and
the design of the algorithms required to process the on-board data. The design work
done in this chapter has been based on the requirements and functional analysis given















The following chapter details the process followed to manufacture and test the proto-
types of the digital circuitry. This is followed be the details of the testing carried out
to verify the correct operation of the flight computer as laid out in chapter 3. Finally
an analysis of potential failure modes and their effects on the flight computer is given
followed by the means that have been taken to avoid these failures and suggestions for
future work to prevent failures.
5.2 Prototyping
The circuit boards were fabricated on double-sided 1.4mm FR4 substrate. The fab-
rication process used was a routing process with a bare copper or tinned finish. The
circuit boards were then through-hole plated to allow for circuitry on both sides of
the board. The reason further layers were not used is that the cost would have been
too great. However, using more layers would have substantially lowered the circuit
board space required. Therefore increasing the number of layers in the circuit boards













Figure 5.1 shows the first prototype. The photo shows the master node and the recov-
ery node.
Only the master, recovery, GPS, telemetry nodes and the ground station were fabri-
cated for the first prototype. The RF sections of the telemetry node and the ground
station were implemented using development boards.
Prototype 2
Figure 5.2 shows a photo of the completed second prototype of the recovery node.
Prototype 2 involved a complete redesign of the circuit board layouts to use the circuit
board space more efficiently and to reduce the width of the circuit boards. This change
had no bearing on the fundamental design of the flight computer architecture or the
flight computer’s nodes. Consideration was given to the orientation of the circuit
boards for mounting. It was decided that in order to give users access to the ribbon
cable connectors, the pin-headers would be moved from the long axis of the circuit
board to the short axis. This change is shown in Figure 5.2.
Prototype 3
Figure 5.3 is a photo of prototype 3 being prepared for a test launch. The photo shows
the master node, recovery node, GPS node and telemetry node. The IMU is left of
the image and is orientated horizontally rather than vertically as is the case with the
other nodes. This is because of the axes for which the MEMs sensors are configured
to measure. Prototype 3 kept the layout of prototype 2 but fixed the bugs found in the
package layouts. This prototype was the last prototype fabricated for this dissertation.
The significant changes included in this prototype were associated with fixing the pin
orientation in the mosfet packages used on the recovery node and refining the layout
changes made in prototype 2. Before the mosfet changes were integrated with the












Figure 5.1: Prototype 1 [19]. The circuit board on the left is the master node and the












Figure 5.2: Prototype 2 circuit boards.
that the new set-up functioned correctly. Consideration was also given to the type of
power connectors used. It was decided that SMA connectors would make a robust
power connection when torqued to the correct tightness [27].
Prototyping of the RF Circuitry
The following section deals with the fabrication and testing of the RF circuitry asso-
ciated with the telemetry link. This includes the power amplifier, low noise amplifier
and RF switches used in the RF output stage.
Manufacturing Process The RF circuitry was fabricated using the same routing
process as was used with the digital circuitry; however, the substrate used was 20mil
Rogers 4003C. Testing and tuning was done through a process of testing the prototype
boards on a network analyser and then adjusting the line lengths and passive compo-














































Amplifier S11 (dB) S21 (dB) Isolation (dB)
PA -16.412 18.988 —
LNA -14.610 27.509 —
SPDT -16.268 -0.7101 -21.074
Table 5.1: Amalgamated RF output stage results.
Prototyping and Testing The first set of prototypes were fabricated on individual
boards, that is each individual RF component was fabricated on its own board. This
was done to ensure the tuning of each individual component was correct before amal-
gamating all the components onto a single RF output stage. A process of fabrication,
testing and then re-fabrication was followed to achieve the best possible performance
of the prototypes.
Results Once the performance of the individual prototypes was deemed to be ac-
ceptable, the individual RF prototypes were amalgamated into a single circuit board
prototype. Table 5.1 shows the S parameters measured on the network analyser for the
amalgamated RF output stage. For network analyser screen-shots of the performance
of the individual RF components, refer to appendix B.
Even though the results shown in Table 5.1 are in many cases far short of the simulated
ideal results, these results were deemed to be acceptable given that the manufacturing
process used is not accurate enough to produce the boards within the required toler-
ances. For example, the milling process was unable to keep the line widths of the
micro-strip lines consistent. Also because the placement and soldering of the passive
components was done by hand there was variation in the length of the micro-strip be-
tween the pins of the RF IC and the passive components between the simulated design
and the fabricated circuit.
The power amplifier return loss measured from the amalgamated prototype was -
16.412dB versus -25.763dB simulated. However, -16.412dB still represents only
2.29% return from input power. The low noise amplifier return loss from the amal-
gamated prototype was measured to be -14.610dB versus -22.248dB simulated. This
represents a 3.36% return from input power. The SPDT return loss was measured at












These returns were all deemed to be acceptable given the limitations of the manufac-
turing process detailed above.
The gain of the power amplifier was measured at 18.988dB versus 21.189dB. This
translates to an output signal power 79.21 times the power of the input signal. The
low noise amplifier gain was measured at 27.509dB versus 22.409dB simulated. This
measurement was taken for a -30dBm input signal. This is a noticeable improvement
on the simulation. For the SPDT power drop it should be noted that the value shown in
Table 5.1 is the drop across two SPDT switches. This is because in the amalgamated
RF output stage, the input signal must pass through a SPDT before it passes through
an amplifier. The output signal must then pass through another SPDT. The power drop
measured across the two SPDTs together was -0.7101dB versus an expected -0.7dB.
This represents an input signal power loss of approximately 7.54% and an ouput signal
power loss of approximately 7.54% . This is a significant power loss, however, it is
the expected loss when considering the simulation.
Graphical-User-Interface
Figure 5.4 shows a screen-shot of the ground-station graphical-user-interface (GUI).
The GUI was written in C++ using version 4 of the Qt framework. The flight computer
makes use of an FTDI serial to USB converter on its ground station, this simplifies
interfacing with the computer. The GUI interfaces with the Linux POSIX driver in
order to receive data via the serial port. The GUI includes the ability to log all the data
received from the serial port to a file.
The left-hand column of tick boxes and numerical displays is dedicated to the control
and status of the power management unit. The tick boxes provide control of each
of the power management unit’s channels. When a channel is activated its current is
shown in the numerical display to the right of tick box. The voltages measured by the
flight computer power management unit are displayed below the channel currents.
The right-hand column of tick boxes is for the control of the igniter channels. The tick
boxes enable or disable each igniter channel. The software limits the user to enable











5.3. FIRMWARE ALGORITHMS AND SIMULATION TESTING
igniters and a fire button is provided to fire the enabled igniter channel manually. The
lower right-hand numerical displays show the GPS position and inertial measurement
output of altitude acceleration and velocity. System time is displayed in the bottom
right-hand corner. This GUI meets the function requirements of F21 in that it provides
a way for a user to control the flight computer.
In order to plot data in real-time and so better fulfil function F20, the GUI was ex-
tended to include a plotting function. This was written using the Qwt widget [28] for
the Qt framework. Figure 5.5 shows a plot using the GUI plotting function.
5.3 Firmware Algorithms and Simulation Testing
The following section deals with the implementation of the firmware algorithms and
the testing to verify their functionality. It also details all testing done in accordance
with the testing procedures outlined in chapter 3. It should be noted that some tests
were not possible because of the time constraints on the project.
Firmware Algorithm Implementation
Due to time constraints only the linear constant gain Kalman filter and the event detec-
tion algorithms shown in chapter 4.3 were implemented. These algorithms were first
written as a PC application in the C language using floating-point arithmetic. This
was done to expedite the development of the algorithms and to provide a platform on
which to test the algorithms easily.
In order to test the functionality of these algorithms, real flight datasets were obtained
through the RDAS mailing list. This data was then fed into the algorithms and the
filtered outputs were plotted over the original data. Figure 5.6 shows a zoomed in
section of a plot of the filtered altitude over the measured altitude at apogee. Figure
5.5 shows a zoomed in section of a plot of the filtered acceleration over the measured
acceleration during the burn phase of the rocket. The green line in Figure 5.5 is the
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using the Kalman filter.
Once the filtering was deemed to function correctly, as shown in the Figures 5.6 and
5.5, the outputs of the filter were fed into an event detection algorithm. The purpose
of the event detection algorithm was to detect all the events in requirement R2. The
detection method for each of the functions is given below:
• R2.1 - Launch - Launch is detected by monitoring the filtered Z - axis accelera-
tion for a sustained acceleration greater than 1g over 5 acceleration samples.
• R2.2 - Stage-Burnout - Stage-burnout is detected by monitoring the filtered Z
- axis acceleration for a sign change in the acceleration measurement sustained
over 5 acceleration samples.
• R2.5 - Apogee - Apogee is detected by monitoring the filtered altitude for a
sustained decrease in altitude. This is achieved by taking 8 samples of filtered
acceleration and averaging them over the time the samples were taken. If more
than three consecutive sets of samples show a decrease in altitude then apogee
is detected.
• R2.6 - Landing - Landing may only be detected after apogee is detected. It is
detected by averaging the filtered altitude over sets of 5 seconds. If there is no
detected change in altitude, then landing is detected.
No flight data was available for multi-stage rockets for use to refine detection algo-
rithms for the stage-separation and stage-ignition event detection requirements.
In order to test the detection of these events the output of the detection algorithm
was plotted over the filtered and unfiltered data. This may be seen in Figure 5.9, the
vertical magenta line at time 6.287s represents the detection of apogee. The detection
of launch may be seen in Figure 5.8 at time 0.0050s by the magenta vertical line.
The detection of stage burnout may be seen in 5.7, the magenta vertical line at time
28.318s represents stage-burnout. This simulation process was repeated for fifteen
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Figure 5.7: Plot of measured acceleration (blue) and filtered acceleration (red) of the
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Figure 5.8: Plot of measured altitude (blue) and filtered altitude (red) of the launch
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Figure 5.9: Plot of measured altitude (blue) and filtered altitude (red) of the apogee
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Figure 5.10: Trace of the execution time of the floating-point Kalman filter algo-
rithm. The floating-point execution time is shown in orange sandwiched in between
two functions, shown in green, placed to mark the algorithm out.
Having verified the functionality of the above algorithms, the algorithms were con-
verted into embedded C code. The floating-point arithmetic was replaced with fixed-
point arithmetic [29]. This was done because the MCF51JM128 node processor does
not have a floating-point unit and therefore floating-point calculations are carried out
through firmware algorithms. This increases the execution time of floating-point cal-
culations substantially because the firmware implementation is computationally ex-
pensive. Therefore, in order to reduce the execution time of the algorithm, fixed-point
arithmetic is required. Both the floating-point and fixed-point versions of the algo-
rithm were profiled on the node hardware. Figure 5.10 shows a trace of the floating-
point Kalman filter algorithm execution time. The algorithm is only functioning in
one dimension, however, the execution time for all three dimensions would simply
be a multiple of three of the measured execution time. In Figure 5.10 one can see
the effect of the firmware routines used to implement floating-point arithmetic in the
three dummy routines Fn15, Fn14 and Fn12. The total execution time of the floating-
point Kalman filter algorithm is 34.62µs. Figure 5.11 shows a trace of the fixed-point
Kalman filter algorithm. Again the algorithm is only functioning one dimension. The
total execution time of the fixed-point Kalman filter algorithm is 14µs. This is 2.47
times faster than the floating-point algorithm. In three dimensions this equates to a
fixed-point execution time of 42µs and a floating-point execution time of 103.86µs.
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Figure 5.11: Trace of the execution time of the fixed-point Kalman filter algorithm.
The fixed-point execution time is shown in orange sandwiched in between two func-
tions, shown in green, placed to mark the algorithm out.
F10, F13 and F14.
Environmental Testing
Due to a lack of access to the correct facilities within the time frame of the project,
temperature and vibration testing were not possible. It should be noted that these two
tests are the most important environmental tests for rocket flight. Care needs to be
taken to ensure that the temperature variations in flight do not cause large variations
in the frequency of operation of the different nodes. To this end the final prototype of
the flight computer should make use of temperature-compensated crystal oscillators.
However, care also needs to be taken to ensure that the crystals used are able to survive
the vibration environment. This is due to the fact that crystal oscillators can shatter in
high vibration environments.
The only testing opportunity available within the time frame of the project was vacuum
testing of the circuit boards. This was done in order to ensure that the components on
the circuit boards would not out-gas when placed in a vacuum. In order to test this
a circuit board was placed within a vacuum chamber, and the pressure was reduced
to below 0.1kPa. The circuit board within the vacuum chamber utilised the node
processor and associated electronics such as a crystal oscillator. The circuit board
was made to cycle through its RAM whilst in the vacuum chamber and output this to
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board was monitored to ensure that it was functioning correctly. This test verified
the ability of the electronics in the flight computer to operate in the atmosphere at an
altitude of 50km. A full test making use of the whole flight computer in the vacuum
chamber should be performed but this was not possible in the vacuum chamber that
was used.
Function and Requirement Verification
The following section details how the functional requirements as well as the stresses
and constraints in Requirement R13, detailed in chapter 3, have been met.
R13.1 - Size In order to meet requirement 13.1, the flight computer circuit boards
have been designed with a maximum width of 52mm and a maximum length of 90mm.
In Figure 5.3 the flight computer is shown fitted on a structure able to fit in a payload
bay with a maximum length of 240mm.
R13.2 - Mass Prototype 3 shown in Figure 5.3, weighed approximately 450g. This
included two battery packs, the master node, the recovery node, the GPS node, the
telemetry node and the IMU node.
R13.3 - Power Usage The flight computer draws a maximum of 200mA per node,
therefore it draws a total maximum of 1A. This equates to a total of 1667mAh required
for 100 minutes of operation. Therefore the flight computer is run from two 1800mAh
battery packs. A test of the operation life of the flight computer with these batteries
was not conducted because not all the nodes were fully populated as the final flight
computer will be. This would render a battery life test as only a partial fulfilment of
the testing procedures.
R13.4 - Acceleration Due to the limitations in access to environment testing equip-
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R13.5 - Temperature Due to the limitations in access to environment testing equip-
ment mentioned above it was not possible to test the flight computer in a temperature
chamber.
R13.6 - Electrical Isolation For the prototypes of the flight computer the use of
solder mask on the circuit boards was deemed too expensive. However, to help fulfil
this requirement the circuit boards should be solder masked to provide a measure of
electrical isolation to the circuit boards. Further, the circuit boards should be sealed to
prevent the condensation caused by rapid temperature changes from shorting pins.
R13.7 - Mechanical Robustness In order to meet Requirement 13.7, the circuit
boards of the flight computer were designed with up to 4 3-mm diameter mounting
holes each. This allows the flight computer to be robustly mounted as shown in Figure
5.3.
R13.8 - Noise Immunity In order to meet Requirement 13.8 the flight computer
was designed using a differential communications bus. Further, the telemetry link
was designed with error detection and correction in order to ensure data integrity.
No tests were carried out to ensure the functionality of the flight computer in a high
electromagnetic radiation environment.
F1 - Inertial Measurement Function 1 was accounted for by designing the inertial
measurement unit, as per Figure 4.10, with measurement in each rotational axis with
a MEMs gyroscope and measurement in each linear axis with a MEMs accelerometer.
However, soldering these components onto the circuit boards was not possible. This
was due to the lack of access to the equipment required to solder packages such as
QFN packages.
F2 - Pressure Measurement Function 2 was accounted for by designing the inertial
measurement unit to include an absolute pressure sensor. Prototype 3 included the fab-
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in this prototype, and the output of the pressure sensor was verified at sea level. Due
to a lack of access to a pressure chamber the procedures for testing function 2 were
not possible in the time available.
F3 - Position Measurement Function 3 was accounted for in the design of the flight
computer by the inclusion of both a GPS node and an inertial measurement node.
The GPS node was tested using a passive cylindrical patch antenna as one would
typically find on a sounding rocket. The tests were carried out in an open area outside
to simulate the conditions of a launch pad. Testing included decoding the NMEA GPS
data stream and monitoring the GPS node for GPS satellite lock. The GPS node was
able to lock with up to 7 satellites when outside of a building. The values of the GPS
coordinates were compared to the known values of the location found through Google
Earth.
In order to determine position from F1 and F2, filtering algorithms were written as
detailed in section 5.2.1. These algorithms were only tested in one dimension, how-
ever, their extension to three dimensions is trivial as each axis is independent of the
other two axes. The difficulty, however, in the development of these algorithms is a
lack of access to test data that includes measurements for 3 linear and 3 rotational axes
measurements. Due to the lack of test data it was not possible to test these algorithms
as laid out in the test procedures for function 3.
F4 - Temperature Measurement Function 4 was accounted for in the design of the
flight computer by the inclusion of a temperature sensor on the inertial measurement
unit. A temperature sensor was included on the Prototype 3 inertial measurement unit
circuit board, and its output was verified at room temperature. However, it was not
possible to properly test and verify the operation of this sensor due to a lack of access
to a temperature chamber in the time available.
F5 - Power Measurement Function 5 was account for in the design of the flight
computer by the inclusion of current sensing on each of the power channels of the
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to each of the channels simultaneously. The output of the current sensors was mea-
sured by the ADCs of the master node, to which they were attached. The data was
then forwarded through the telemetry node, in the flight computer data frame, to the
ground-station and viewed through the ground-station GUI. The outputs of the current
sensors were verified and compared to the expected values measured using a multime-
ter. However, there were some difficulties in prototype 3 with the ADC channels not
correctly measuring the input voltage from the current sensors. This problem affected
the measurement of voltages as well. It is marked for resolution in future work.
F6 and F21 - Operation Monitoring and Status Indication Function 6 was taken
into account in the design of the flight computer firmware as shown in section 4.3.
Each node was given a space on the CAN bus in which to transmit an update message
as shown in Figure 4.12. If the master node does not receive a status update message
from one of the nodes in the assigned period, the master node changes the status of
the flight computer to show that the node is malfunctioning. Before launch, the flight
computer will indicate its status through the master node buzzer. In order to test this,
the flight computer was tested with nodes removed from the CAN bus. When the flight
computer did not receive an update message from the disconnected node, it changed
the buzzer beep to indicate a faulty node, thus verifying both function 6 and function
21.
F7 and F8 - Data Storage and Transmission Function 7 was accounted for in the
design of the flight computer through the inclusion of an SD card on the master node
of the flight computer. In order verify the operation of the SD, card a known dataset
using a repeating pattern was written to the SD card. The contents of the SD card were
then read out by the master node and compared to the data written to the SD card. The
datasets were found to be the same thus verifying the operation of the SD card.
Function 8 was accounted for in the design of the flight computer through the inclu-
sion of a telemetry node. The operation of the telemetry link with the ground-station
was verified by setting up a telemetry link between the ground station and the flight
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station GUI. The data output was found to be the same as when connecting to the flight
computer directly via a USB cable.
In the firmware each data frame is both placed into a buffer on the master node, for
storage on the SD card, and transmitted from the telemetry node to the ground. The
operation of this was tested by running the flight computer on the bench, and monitor-
ing both the output of the flight computer on the ground-station GUI, and the writing
of data to the SD card.
R17 and F9 to F14 - Event Detection The testing and verification of these functions
is detailed in section 5.2.
F15 - Dangerous Trajectory Detection This function was not implemented due to
time constraints on the project. In order to implement this function, the flight computer
needs to keep track of its horizontal displacement, that is, its displacement perpendic-
ular to its altitude. A maximum horizontal displacement would be set before launch
on the flight computer, and the current displacement would be measured against the
displacement limit.
F16 to F18 - Event Initiation Functions 16 to 18 were accounted for in the design
of the flight computer by the inclusion of a recovery node. In order verify the function-
ality of each of the igniter channels on the recovery node, each channel was attached
to a resistive load with an LED. The channels were cycled on and off and the LEDs
were monitored to ensure the switching worked as intended. Further, the charge pump
on the recovery node was tested by enabling it and testing the voltage output across
the terminals of each of the igniter channels. The triggering of the events in functions
17 and 18 were not simulation tested due to a lack of multi-stage rocket flight data.
The ability of the recovery node to provide sufficient current was not tested due to the
time constraints on this project.
F20 - In-Flight Commands Function 20 was implemented through the telemetry
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to control and configure the flight computer both on the ground and in-flight. This
functionality was tested by sending a command to the flight computer requesting that
individual power channels be switched either on or off. Each power channel was then
monitored using a resistive load and an LED to indicate whether it was on or off. The
power channel switching responded correctly when commands were sent to the flight
computer. This verified the operation of the in-flight commands as per the testing
procedures.
5.4 Failure Modes, Effects and Preventative Measures
The following section details potential failure modes and their effect on the operation
of the flight computer.
Failed Power Supply The first and most critical failure is a failure of the main
power supply system. A failure in the main power supply would mean a loss of power
for the entire flight computer system. This failure would disable the flight computer
completely and thus cause mission failure. To mitigate the chance of this failure, a
second battery back has been included in the design of the flight computer. In the
event of a battery failure on the main battery pack, the flight computer will seamlessly
switch over to the reserv battery pack.
In order to prevent mission failure in the event of this failure, critical systems are
provided with backup power supplies. The correct operation of the recovery node is
essential for the deployment of parachutes and thus the recovery of the rocket. In
order to prevent a main power supply failure from disabling the recovery system, the
recovery node has been provided with a backup power supply independent of the main
power supply.
The current measures to ensure the operation of the recovery node may be improved
with the following recommendations. In the event of such a failure, the data required
to determine apogee would no longer be available from the inertial measurement unit.
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rocket flight should be implemented. Further, to increase redundancy, a single Z-axis
accelerometer should be included on the recovery node to provide a rough estimation
of apogee.
Failed Communication Bus Another potential failure is a break in the CAN bus.
The CAN bus is used as the main communication bus of the flight computer. In the
event of a broken wire or pin header a node or nodes could be cut off from the rest
of the flight computer. In the worst case, the recovery node would be cut off from the
inertial measurement unit’s determination of apogee. This failure would then lead to
mission failure as the recovery system would be unable to deploy the parachutes at the
correct time.
There are currently no measures in place to stop this failure from causing a mission
failure. In order to do so, the recovery node should be equipped with independent ways
to calculate apogee. This may be through a time based system as mention above, or
through the addition of simple inertial measurement as mentioned above. A further
measure to reduce the risk of a complete communication breakdown would be to in-
clude a redundant CAN bus. In this case a failure on one bus would not cause any
nodes to be cut off from the rest of the flight computer because communication would
still flow through the second bus.
Babbling Idiot Node A babbling idiot failure is where a single node continually
transmits corrupted data onto the communication bus. The malfunctioning node floods
the communication bus with corrupted data potentially preventing the other nodes
from transmitting on the bus, and severely reducing the available bandwidth on the
bus. The effect of this failure would be similar to that of a failed communication bus.
The individual nodes of the flight computer could be cut off from one another.
In order to reduce the chance of a complete mission failure, the recovery node should
be provided with independent ways of calculating apogee as mentioned above. Fur-
ther, one method of preventing a babbling idiot node from disrupting communication
on the bus is to separate the node from the communication bus with a bus guardian
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when it is scheduled to. This prevents the node from flooding the bus and thus prevents
this failure mode.
Loss of Telemetry A further potential failure is the loss of telemetry. This may be
through the failure of the telemetry node or ground-station, or from a loss of con-
nection between the ground station and the telemetry node. This failure only has
the potential to cause mission failure in the event that apogee is not detected by the
flight computer. This is because it would prevent a manually induced deployment of
parachutes.
In order to prevent this failure from causing a mission failure, the recovery node should
be provided with a means of detecting apogee that is independent of inertial mea-
surement. One method is detailed above and involves the use of a count down to a
pre-calculated time-to-apogee. The calculation is don through means of a pre-flight
simulation.
Node Failure The last potential failures to consider are the individual node failures.
The recovery node and telemetry/ground-station nodes are excluded because their fail-
ure has already been considered above.
• Master Node Failure: The failure of the master node would induce a system
wide power supply failure. This would lead to complete mission failure as de-
tailed above in the discussion of a failed power supply. A further consequence
of this failure is the loss of timing messages on the CAN bus. This would cause
any nodes still operating to drift apart in timing. In the event of more than one
node with backup power, a second redundant timing system could be put in
place through one of the still operating nodes. In the event of not receiving trig-
gering messages after a pre-defined time, this node would then begin to transmit
the timing messages.
• GPS Node Failure: The failure of the GPS node has no major effect on the op-
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to be fused with the inertial measurement data to improve the position approx-
imation. Loss of this data would thus cause the approximation of position to
deteriorate.
• IMU Node Failure: The failure of the IMU node would mean the loss of the
ability of the flight computer to detect in-flight events. This failure will lead
to mission failure in the event that the flight computer cannot detect apogee as
discussed above. Further potential event-detection related failures would in-
clude the failure to detect motor-stage burnout and the subsequent failure to
initiate new motor-stage ignition. This would prevent the rocket from reaching
the intended altitude. In order to prevent these failures causing mission failure,
independent inertial measurement should be included on the recovery node to
provide a backup means of detecting these events.
5.5 Safety and Reliability
The following section deals with the safety of the flight computer when human inter-
face is required and the potential measures to be taken for safe and reliable operation
of the flight computer.
Launch Safety
If the flight computer is used as the device to initiate launch, then the most dangerous
human interface with the flight computer will be after the connection of the motor to
the rocket. In the event of an accidental ignition of the motor, the user may be badly
burned or even killed depending on the size of the motor. In order to prevent this, a
number of safety locks have been included on the recovery node. The recovery node
is the node that is responsible for the firing of igniters to trigger launch or other events.
As mentioned in the recovery node feature list of chapter 4, the recovery node has a
set of interlocks that are designed to prevent the accidental ignition of a rocket motor.
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1. Arm enable logic signal high.
2. Next the fire enable logic signal high.
3. Next the user needs to select an igniter channel and enable it with a logic signal
high.
4. Finally the user needs to issue the fire command via a logic high on the fire line.
Only with all the other interlocks at a logic high will this command work.
Each logic signal high switches a solid state switch on the recovery node.
A further safety measure is the inclusion of an extension to the recovery node that
allows the user to enable or disable each igniter channel individually with a hardware
jumper. The hardware jumper provides a physical disconnection of the current flow to
the igniter. This extension also includes a visual indication of which logic signals are
high. This feature is to warn a user of the danger of a live igniter channel.
A shortcoming of this design is the fact that the user must physically close the jumper,
to enable the firing of the motor, whilst on the launch pad. This still presents a safety
hazard for the user. One potential solution would be to automate the closing of the
igniter jumper with a small servo motor controlled via an independent wireless link. A
second solution would be to change the configuration of the jumper so that removal of
the jumper enables the igniter channel. In this case, a physical disconnection between
the igniter and the current source could be made with a normally open relay. This
would enable the user to move a safe distance away from the launch site, and then pull
a lead which then enables the launch system.
Igniter Ignition Safety
A second human interface with the rocket, that presents a safety hazard for the user,
is the connection of the igniters themselves. The accidental activation of an igniter
may cause harm to the user through electrical shock or burns. The same measures












The Use of Reliable C Compilers
Normally in the aerospace industry to ensure the safe and reliable operation of firmware,
programming standards and certified compilers are used. This is to prevent the pro-
grammer from using any features of the language that may be ambiguous or lead to
undefined behaviour, and to prevent the programmer from using any features of the
language that have the potential to fail. One such standard is the MISRA C standard
[31]. Due to the cost of using such a standard, and an associated compiler, no standards
or certified compilers have been used in the development of this flight computer.
Error Correction Via Voting
Often in aerospace systems, error detection and correction are achieved through vot-
ing. This is normally done by triplicating the system so that three independent outputs
of the same system are available. These outputs are then connected to a voting system.
The voting system compares the outputs of each of the systems and allows the major-
ity output to propagate. In this way errors are prevented and the overall reliability of
the system is increased. In the case of the SAAO flight computer, the space, weight,
power and budget constraints on the project have precluded this as a general reliability
solution. However, in future revisions of the flight computer, inclusion of this method-
ology should be considered for the increased reliability of the recovery node as it is
the most critical system to the safe and reliable use of a sounding rocket.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented the implementation of the flight computer in hard-
ware prototypes, firmware and the ground-station GUI. We then described the testing
carried out on these prototypes to verify the functions detailed in chapter 3. Finally,
examined the potential failure modes of the flight computer and their effect on the
operation of the flight computer. We have detailed the measures taken to prevent these












looked at potential safety and reliability issues in the use of the flight computer and,












Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Introduction
The following chapter gives an overview of the achievements and results of this disser-
tation. We also note the features that were not considered for this project due to time or
budget constraints. Based on these features and the achievements of this dissertation
we then make suggestions for future work in the project.
6.2 Achievements
In this dissertation we have developed a flight computer for sounding rockets. We
started by reviewing two projects of similar intent in order to ascertain how other peo-
ple have approached this design problem. We then analysed the requirements and
constraints, for the flight computer, provided by SAAO. From those requirements we
derived the functions that the flight computer is required to carry out. We then pre-
sented the testing procedures required to verify that the flight computer is able to carry
out the required functions and operate within the constraints provided by SAAO. With
this background we then designed the flight computer, starting with the overall ar-












nodes. This design included the design of the hardware of the nodes as well as the
design of the operating system and algorithms to run on the flight computer hardware.
The hardware design consisted of two parts, first the digital hardware design for the
nodes, and second, the RF simulation and hardware design of the RF output staqe.
Once the design was completed we began developing a series of prototypes, each one
a step forward in achieving the functionality required of the flight computer. Once we
had produced a working prototype, we began the development of the time-triggered
operating system of the flight computer, as well as the ground-station graphical user
interface. We also developed event detection and filtering algorithms which we simu-
lated and tested on a desktop computer before optimising them and running them on
the flight computer itself.
Due to the time and resource constraints on the project a few features were not imple-
mented in this dissertation. These include:
• Algorithms for the detection of separation and new-stage-ignition, as per F11
and F12, were not developed due to a lack of multi-stage rocket flight data. It
would not have been possible to test the detection of these events, thus it was
decided to omit them from the firmware for the moment.
• An algorithm for detection of a trajectory outside of nominal trajectory, as per
F15, was not developed. This was due to time constraints on the project. Such an
algorithm requires the implementation of an attitude filter in order to determine
accurate horizontal displacement.
• F17 and F18, the separation of rocket stages and the ignition of rocket stage
motors, were not simulation tested due to a lack of multi-stage rocket flight
data. The ability of the firing mechanisms to supply sufficient current to fire
the igniters was not tested either. This was due to the time constraints on the
project. However, the mechanisms to trigger the firing of the igniters to enable













A number of features laid out in the requirements of SAAO were not completed due to
the time constraints on this dissertation. These features were relegated to future work
and are documented here.
Features
The following features should be added to the flight computer in future work.
Flight Termination In order to launch rockets above a certain altitude at a test range,
the rockets require an independent flight termination module. A flight terminate mod-
ule would allow the user to terminate the flight of the rocket. This is to ensure that a
rocket that goes off the predicted flight path will not cause damage to any persons or
property. This should be done in line with the requirements of SAAO namely require-
ment R11.
GPS A COTs GPS receiver was used in this project. However, in order for the GPS
to function under all possible flight conditions, a GPS receiver not constrained by the
ITAR regulations is required.
Ground Station GUI The ground-station graphical user interface needs to be ex-
tended to provide clear visual information to the user. The ability to simulate and
plot the rocket’s trajectory should be included as well as the ability to plot the actual
trajectory of the rocket in real time over the simulated trajectory. This will provide
the user with clear information with which to make decisions with regard to the flight
termination module.
Complete Inertial Measurement and Guidance and Control Due to time con-












inertial measurement unit, a full 6-degree of freedom inertial measurement unit was
not constructed. This will need to be addressed in future work. Once manufactured,
the testing procedures outlined in section 3.6 for F1 should be carried out to verify the
correct operation of the inertial measurement unit and its algorithms.
In order to improve the approximation of position done through the inertial mea-
surement unit’s filtering algorithms, the GPS coordinates measured on the GPS node
should be fused with the position approximation data obtained through the inertial
sensors.
Once manufactured and tested, the flight computer’s inertial measurement unit will
provide the platform from which a rocket’s trajectory may be controlled, for example,
via gimballing a rocket motor. Any mission requiring the precision placement of a
payload at a specific location would require this functionality. Proof of the inertial
measurement unit’s ability to fulfil this requirement could be accomplished through
using the inertial measurement unit to actuate control surfaces.
Requirements and Constraints
Electrical Isolation The current prototypes of the flight computer are not solder-
masked or sealed with a conformal coating. In order to improve the electrical isolation
of the flight computer circuit boards, the circuit boards should be solder-masked. This
will provide isolation of the circuit board tracks. Further isolation and protection
may be provided by sealing the circuit board with a conformal coating. This coating
will also protect the circuit board against shorts from the condensation that will occur
during the rapid temperature changes the flight computer will undergo.
Size In order to reduce the size of the flight computer, which will allow it to placed in
even smaller diameter rockets, the circuit boards should be redesign with four layers.














Detection of Stage-Separation and New Stage-Ignition Algorithms for the detec-
tion of stage-separation and new stage-ignition should be developed as per F11 and
F12. In order to test and refine these algorithms, multi-stage rocket flight data will be
required.
Triggering of Stage-Separation and New Stage-Ignition In order to fulfil the re-
quirements of F17, the detection of motor burnout should be set up to trigger stage-
separation for rockets that use pyrotechnics to separate stages.
The detection of stage-separation should be set up to trigger the firing of an igniter
for new stage-ignition. This is in order to fulfil F18. Finally, the ability of the firing
mechanism to provide the current necessary to fire the igniters should be tested to
verify fully functions F16 to F18.
Detection of Outside Nominal Trajectory In order to fulfil the requirements of
F15, an algorithm should be written to detect trajectories that are outside a given safe
zone. As a pre-requisite to this algorithm, an attitude filter should be written in order to
accurately determine the attitude of the rocket. Further, the constant gain Kalman filter
used to determine the position of the rocket should be extended to three dimensions, as
mentioned above. Through these additions and extensions the flight computer would
be able to determine the horizontal displacement of the rocket. This would enable the
detection of a displacement that would place the rocket outside a given zone of safe
operation.
Environmental Testing
Due to a lack of time and access to facilities the environment testing laid out in section
3.6 was not done. This testing is critical to verifying the ability of the flight computer
to carry out F1 to F21 reliably. In particular testing of the flight computer under the












of these variables have the potential to impair severely the functioning of the flight
computer.
Crystal Oscillators In order to ensure that the flight computer operates reliably with
the temperature variations experienced during rocket flight, the crystal oscillators cur-
rently used should be replaced with temperature-compensated crystal oscillators. This
will ensure that the in-flight temperature variations do not cause a large drift in the
operational frequency of each of the flight computer’s nodes. This is important be-
cause a variation in the frequency of operation of the nodes will alter the sample time
of the sensors and thus the algorithms for the calculation of acceleration, velocity and
position will begin to produce erroneous outputs.
Failure Modes, Reliability and Safety
Section 5.4 and 5.5 presented a number of failure modes, reliability issues and safety
issues. In each case, a solution was suggested either to prevent a failure mode or
to improve reliability and safety. In future work the suggestion made in this section
should be considered for implementation.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed the achievements presented in this dissertation. We
have also discussed the features that did not see implementation or were only partially
implemented or partially tested in this dissertation due to time or other resource con-
straints. Based on both of these, recommendations were then made for future work to













The following were the conditions of testing and the S parameters measured by the
network analyser.
Power Amplifier The power amplifier was tested with the following setup:
• Input Power: 0dBm
• Supply Voltage: 3.3V
• Calibration with 25dBm attenuator
Low Noise Amplifier The low noise amplifier was tested with the following setup:
• Input Power: -30dBm
• Supply Voltage: 5V











SPDT The SPDT was tested with the following setup:
• Input Power: 0dBm
• Switching Voltage: 1.8V
• Calibration with no attenuator
The following figures show the measured S11, S21 and Isolation of the individual low
noise amplifier, power amplifier and SPDT components.
Power Amplifier S11























Low Noise Amplifier S11











Low Noise Amplifier S21











Single Pole Double Throw Switch S11











Single Pole Double Throw Switch S21











Single Pole Double Throw Switch Isolation












CAD Files and Code
The schematics and board designs for the both the RF hardware and the digital hard-
ware may be found on the attached CD. Also included on the CD are the firmware
drivers for each of the nodes as well as the operating system files for the flight com-
puter as a whole. The graphical user interface code is also included with the files
required for it to compile and run. The following directory structure may be found on
the CD:
• Appendix B Folders
– CAD Files
* Digital CAD Files
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